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INTRODUCTION
This Article assesses the work of the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (JCAR), a bipartisan legislative committee that reviews—and, since 2005, sometimes vetoes—rules and regulations
proposed by administrative agencies in Illinois. JCAR is a busy committee, having reviewed nearly all of the more than 20,000 rules proposed by state agencies since it was created in 1978.1 JCAR has
recommended improvements to thousands of these rules, and agencies
have typically been responsive to the committee’s suggestions. But
JCAR is also a controversial body. Since September 2004, it has been
authorized by the Illinois General Assembly to veto agency rulemak* Acting Associate Dean and Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. I
would like to thank Robert Knowles, Heidi Kuehl, Daniel McConkie, Jeffrey Parness, Laurel
Rigertas, and Amy Widman for their insights and advice. I received excellent research assistance from Nicholas Atwood, Patricia Donahue, Jacqueline Hollis, and Cora Moy.
1. See infra Figure 2.
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ing,2 a power of dubious constitutionality, which, as will be discussed
below, JCAR has used to kill rules with increasing frequency.
A companion piece to this Article argues that JCAR’s veto powers
are incompatible with the Illinois constitution.3 The chief problem is
that the Illinois General Assembly has authorized JCAR, a legislative
body made up of twelve of its members, to engage in lawmaking without complying with the state constitutional requirements of bicameralism (which requires statutes to be approved by majorities of both
houses of the General Assembly) or of presentment (which requires
statutes to be sent to the Governor for a possible executive veto). Although the Illinois courts have not yet addressed the constitutionality
of the JCAR legislative veto—or of the General Assembly’s veto
powers, which predated the JCAR veto4—similar legislative veto
schemes have been ruled unconstitutional in at least a dozen other
states5 and in the federal system.6 In contrast, the constitutionality of
a legislative veto scheme has been affirmed in only one state that had
not previously amended its constitution specifically to allow such vetoes.7 In addition, no state court has upheld the constitutionality of a
scheme like that in Illinois, in which a legislative committee can kill
agency rulemaking of its own accord.
Inevitably the Illinois courts will be forced to decide on the constitutionality of legislative vetoes. The moment seemed ripe as recently
as 2008, when a taxpayer sued the Illinois Department of Healthcare
and Family Services after it sought to implement a rule expanding
Medicaid eligibility even though JCAR had vetoed the rule.8 ThenGovernor Rod Blagojevich had ordered the Department to ignore
JCAR’s veto, asserting on separation-of-powers grounds that it was
2. See Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 2004 Ill. Laws 4328, 4334; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
100/115-a(c) (2014).
3. Marc D. Falkoff, The Legislative Veto in Illinois: Why JCAR Review of Agency Rulemaking
Is Unconstitutional, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1055 (2016).
4. From 1981 to 2004, JCAR could ask the General Assembly to permanently block implementation of an agency’s rules, which the legislature could then accomplish by passing a joint
resolution that did not require presentment to the governor. See 1980 Ill. Laws 3898, 3900–02.
5. See Falkoff, supra note 3, at 1083–91 (discussing the state court decisions and attorney
general opinions that held that legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking were unlawful under state
constitutions).
6. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953–54 (1983) (holding that a congressional legislative
veto violated the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the U.S. Constitution).
7. In a much-criticized opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a
procedure that allowed the state’s legislature to veto executive agency rulemaking through passage of a joint resolution, which was not required to be presented to the governor for a potential
veto. See Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410, 412 (Idaho 1990).
8. See Caro v. Blagojevich, 895 N.E.2d 1091, 1094–96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
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unlawful.9 Although the question of the constitutionality of the legislative veto was teed up for the courts, the case ended up being settled
by Governor Patrick Quinn before the courts could resolve the
issue.10
Quinn was in a position to settle the case because Blagojevich had
by then been impeached by the House of Representatives, convicted
by the Senate, and removed from office.11 One of the (ironic) articles
of impeachment against Mr. Blagojevich was that he had violated separation-of-powers principles by failing to respect the JCAR veto that
he alleged was issued in violation of separation-of-powers principles.12
Blagojevich indeed was convicted and removed from office in part on
this ground. Thus, while much of the public’s attention was focused
on Blagojevich’s “sale” of the U.S. Senate seat that had formerly been
occupied by President Barack Obama (who was also once a member
of JCAR), a constitutional crisis was playing out in plain sight, although few noticed.
This Article addresses the distinct question of whether JCAR’s exercise of its veto power has benefitted the citizens of Illinois. Such a
focus may seem odd, given the just-stated assertion that legislative vetoes should be declared unlawful under the state constitution. But it is
necessary to address the effectiveness and utility of legislative commit9. Blagojevich explained his reasoning in a statement to the Illinois Senate after he was impeached by the Illinois House of Representatives:
If you want to stop the Executive Branch under our Constitution and the ideas of
separation of powers, then you all know how it works. The House passes a bill. You, in
the Senate pass a bill. I may not like it. You send it to me. I veto that bill, it goes back
to you, and then you override my veto.
That’s how you stop the Executive Branch and a governor. But 12 lawmakers, however, however intelligent and honest and impressive and schooled as you may be, 12
lawmakers picked by a legislative—by legislative leaders cannot constitutionally thwart
the Executive Branch. Nine states, nine states have challenged this case, and in all nine
states, the right of the Executive Branch to do what it sought to do without the consent
of JCAR was upheld.
4 Impeachment of Governor Rod R. Blagojevich: Hearing Before the Hon. C.J. Thomas Fitzgerald, S. 96th Gen. Assemb. 596–97 (Ill. 2009) (statement of Govenor Rod R. Blagojevich).
10. See John O’Connor, Quinn, Businessmen Settle Suit on Health Care, PATAGRAPH (June 23,
2009), http://www.pantagraph.com/news/quinn-businessmen-settle-suit-on-health-care/article_85d950d0-02ee-5555-ba1e-d8f435b6b22a.html.
11. Judgment of Conviction & Disqualification, In re Impeachment of Rod R. Blagojevich,
Governor of the State of Illinois, S. 96th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.ilga.gov/
senate/impeachment/documents/Judgment%20of%20Conviction%20and%20Disqualification.
pdf.
12. The separation-of-powers argument advanced by the House of Representatives can be
found in the report of the special investigative committee for the Blagojevich impeachment.
FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE 29–36 (Jan. 8, 2009), http://
www.ilga.gov/house/committees/95Documents/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Special%20
Investigative%20Committee.pdf.
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tee vetoes for several reasons. First, the Illinois courts have not yet
decided whether the JCAR veto is constitutional.13 It would be foolish to presume to know for sure how the courts will rule on the question of the legislative veto scheme in Illinois, particularly given its
longevity and the powerful legislative interests that have sustained it
thus far. Second, even if the courts do conclude that the JCAR veto is
unlawful, the state constitution can be amended to reinstate it.14
Other states have followed such a course after adverse judicial rulings.15 Finally, analysis of the unique and lengthy history of the deployment of the legislative veto in Illinois may hold lessons for other
states that either retain a similar system or are contemplating the
adoption of one in the future.
This Article does not seek to condemn JCAR per se. Indeed, as
originally conceived, the Committee’s admirable purpose was to be a
cooperative body that reviewed all agency rules and offered guidance
about how to assure they conformed with the intentions of the General Assembly.16 Any fair assessment of JCAR’s work over its more
than three-and-a-half decades must acknowledge the great number of
recommendations for improving rules that JCAR has offered and that
agencies have accepted. To the degree JCAR continues to play that
role, it provides tremendous value to the state. Nor should this Article be understood as an indictment of the JCAR staff, a group of employees whom agency representatives routinely describe as
hardworking and professional. JCAR’s public outreach has also, by
and large, redounded much to the benefit of the public by providing
lucid summaries of key rulemaking activity in its frequently issued
Flinn Reports, which summarize JCAR and agency activity, as well as
in the publication of its annual reports.17
13. See infra notes 21–29 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional challenges).
14. Amending the Illinois constitution to allow a legislative veto scheme could be accomplished in one of two ways. The first is by a constitutional convention. See ILL. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 1. The second is through a legislatively referred, constitutional amendment. See id. § 2.
15. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. 2 (allowing agency rules to be blocked by the legislature or a
committee of the legislature as prescribed by law); IOWA CONST. art. III, § 40 (allowing the
legislature to stop the implementation of agency rule by joint resolution); NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1
(allowing the legislature to nullify agency rules by majority vote of both houses); N.J. CONST.
art. 4, § 4, ¶ 6 (allowing the legislature to stop the implementation of agency rules through the
passage of a joint resolution); S.C. CONST. art. III, § 18 (allowing joint resolutions to have the
effect of law); Opinion No. 86-39, 1986 S.C. OP. ATT’Y GEN. 120 (concluding that the legislative
veto process of agency rulemaking was constitutional due to the passage of Section 18 of Article
III).
16. See discussion infra notes 119–20 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose behind
JCAR).
17. See infra notes 142–50, 158–63, 168–75, and accompanying text (providing summaries of
JCAR decisions on agency rulemaking).
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But the fact remains that for just over a decade, JCAR—a body
whose membership consists of twelve legislators, six from the House
and six from the Senate, equally divided between political parties—
has held and exercised the contentious power of the legislative veto,
an authority that can alter the institutional balance of power in Illinois
in fundamental ways. The JCAR veto power in particular has realigned power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches
in ways that should be acknowledged.
To be sure, there is a good deal of intuitive appeal to legislative veto
schemes. The legislative veto is the most direct and practical way for
legislatures to police agencies and ensure that they exercise only the
rulemaking authority delegated to them, and to make certain that
agencies do not cross the (fuzzy) line into lawmaking.18 Legislative
veto schemes may also be thought to enhance democratic legitimacy
(because the legislature will determine whether the rulemaking will go
into effect), promote political accountability (by leaving final responsibility for rules in the hands of elected legislators), and ensure that
the power to make policy remains with the elected representatives of
the people rather than with unelected appointees of the governor.19
In addition, legislative vetoes may keep legislators accountable to the
public in a way that agency representatives cannot.20
That said, legislative veto schemes have been subject to wide critique, including most comprehensively by Professor Arthur Earl Bonfield in his seminal book, State Administrative Rule Making.21 For
example, legislative veto systems have the potential to unduly
strengthen the legislature’s authority over the executive branch by removing the Governor’s constitutional veto power and weakening her
bargaining position.22 Special interest groups may be more likely to
18. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 999 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (observing that legislative vetoes are the only practical way for Congress to ensure that executive agencies restrict
themselves to rulemaking).
19. See Andrew P. Morriss, Professor, Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, Testimony to Gen.
Assemb.—Principles of Administrative Law Overview (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.ilga.gov/
house/committees/95Documents/Committee%20Exhibit%2050.pdf (articulating these arguments in testimony before the Illinois General Assembly).
20. See Jerry L. Anderson & Christopher Poynor, A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of
Iowa’s Administrative Rules Review Committee Procedure, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 27 (2012).
There is voluminous literature on policy issues surrounding the legislative veto. See Philip P.
Frickey, The Constitutionality of Legislative Committee Suspension of Administrative Rules: The
Case of Minnesota, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1237, 1259 n.93 (1986) (listing sources).
21. See ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING (1986); see also
Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative Rulemaking Procedure, 18
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617 (1991) (offering similar arguments and observations).
22. State Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 444 (N.J. 1982) (“Broad legislative veto
power deters executive agencies in the performance of their constitutional duty to enforce ex-
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exercise undue influence over legislative committees that have veto
power over agency rulemaking.23 Agencies that draft rules in the
shadow of legislative vetoes may be more influenced by legislators
than by the public rulemaking process.24 The public might be misled
about who is ultimately responsible for rules that are promulgated by
agencies but that require legislative approval.25 Allowing a small
committee to exercise a veto “creates the likelihood that a small number of legislators will . . . effectively subvert the will of the entire legislative body.”26 Legislators may be lulled into making overly broad
delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies out of a “false sense
of security” that the legislature will be able to adequately oversee the
rules that are actually produced.27
Academics have assessed the constitutionality of legislative veto
schemes for a variety of state systems.28 But there has been relatively
little inquiry into the real-world functioning of extant legislative veto
systems—notwithstanding Professor Bonfield’s observation in 1986
isting laws. Its vice lies not only in its exercise but in its very existence. Faced with potential
paralysis from repeated uses of the veto that disrupt coherent regulatory schemes, officials may
retreat from the execution of their responsibilities. They will resort to compromises with legislative committees aimed at drafting rules that the current Legislature will find acceptable.”); BONFIELD, supra note 21, § 8.3.2(d), at 507.
23. A committee or legislative veto of rules “may be more susceptible to undue influence by
special interest groups seeking action inconsistent with the political will of the entire body politic
and contrary to the public interest, than is a veto . . . by the usual statutory enactment process
involving both houses and the governor.” BONFIELD, supra note 21, § 8.3.2, at 508. Marcus E.
Ethridge conducted a pre-Chadha study that found that states with legislative review schemes
over agency action led to “probable changes in the substance of public policies” adopted by the
agencies because of the legislative oversight, and that “potential political influence is an important determinant of committee action.” Marcus E. Ethridge, Consequences of Legislative Review
of Agency Regulations in Three U.S. States, 9 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 161, 174–75 (1984).
24. The legislative veto may have the unintended consequence of “inducing administrators to
develop rules primarily or exclusively on the basis of contacts with legislators rather than on the
basis of public rule-making proceedings.” BONFIELD, supra note 21, § 8.3.2, at 509.
25. Vesting a veto over agency rules in the legislative branch may create a false impression
with the public that the legislature is responsible for the “legality and desirability of all rules of
all agencies.” Id. § 8.3.2, at 510.
26. Id. § 8.3.2, at 510–11. This concern is somewhat mitigated in Illinois by the availability of
a General Assembly joint resolution override of the JCAR veto. But even so, the committee or
full legislative veto would in at least some instances potentially be overriding the will of an
earlier General Assembly that had passed the original authorizing legislation.
27. Id.
28. Ethridge, supra note 23, passim; L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of
Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982);
David S. Neslin, Comment, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Gubernatorial and Legislative Review of Agency Rulemaking Under the 1981 Model Act, 57 WASH. L. REV. 669, 682–86 (1982);
Misty Ventura, Comment, The Legislative Veto: A Move away from Separation of Powers or a
Tool to Ensure Nondelegation?, 49 SMU L. REV. 401, 415–17, 421–27 (1996); David Pascal
Zambito, Comment, An “Irrc-some” Issue: Does Pennsylvania’s Regulatory Review Act Violate
the Separation of Powers?, 101 DICKINSON L. REV. 643, 650–60 (1997).
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that “[m]uch more systematic empirical work needs to be done to
study the actual operation and effect of institutions like the administrative rules review committee.”29 This Article seeks to fill some of
that void.
This Article collects and reviews data covering Illinois agency
rulemaking and JCAR activity for thirty-seven years, beginning from
the time of JCAR’s creation in 1978 through 2014, the most recent
year for which JCAR has published an annual report.30 Its purpose is
severalfold. First, this Article seeks to ascertain the changing volume
of agency rulemaking during JCAR’s tenure. If the annual number of
rules proposed (or implemented on an emergency basis) has tended to
decrease since JCAR began to engage in systematic review, one might
hypothesize that JCAR has enhanced the efficiency of agency
rulemaking. Of course the efficiency hypothesis is just that—a conjecture that, first, JCAR is responsible for the decrease in volume and,
second, that the production of fewer rules represents movement toward a more optimal volume of rulemaking. These assumptions are
debatable but are probably more defensible in the context of agencies’
“emergency” rulemaking, because emergency rules are created and
implemented without the ordinary public notice-and-comment
procedures.
A second purpose of this Article is to determine whether the increasing powers that the General Assembly has periodically given to
JCAR have affected the manner by which JCAR interacts with agencies. JCAR was created as a body designed to inform and advise the
General Assembly about agency rulemaking and to work collaboratively with agencies to assure that their rules aligned with legislative
intent. But JCAR, early in its tenure, was given some coercive power
by the General Assembly, authorizing JCAR to keep rules from going
into effect for up to 180 days and establishing a procedure by which
JCAR could seek a joint resolution from the General Assembly that
would permanently kill an agency’s rulemaking. In addition, since
September 2004, JCAR has possessed the ultimate coercive power in
the form of veto power over agency rules. The data show that JCAR
has largely abandoned collaborative procedures and instead has come
to rely largely on its coercive tools.
29. BONFIELD, supra note 21, § 8.3.1(f), at 492. But see Anderson & Poynor, supra note 20, at
27 (noting the inconsistencies in Bonfield’s support for agency decision making models with,
more or less, insulation from political pressures); Ethridge, supra note 23, at 174–75 (concluding
that legislative veto schemes in several states led to “probable changes in the substance of public
policies” adopted by the agencies, and that “potential political influence is an important determinant of committee action”).
30. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
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The data can be instructive, but in the end raw numbers can tell us
only so much about whether the JCAR review scheme has benefitted
Illinois. For example, while a decreased volume of rulemaking may
indicate that the threat of a General Assembly or JCAR veto discouraged unnecessary rulemaking, the same data might reasonably reflect
that the hovering veto power has dissuaded agencies from proposing
rules or implementing emergency rules that should have gone into effect. The final part of this Article begins to address this concern by
investigating whether JCAR has confined itself to working within the
statutory limits of its authority or, instead, whether its deployment of
its veto powers has been ultra vires.31 Among the chief problems this
Article reveals is that JCAR routinely disregards the General Assembly’s statutory limit on the exercise of its prohibition and suspension
powers, which may be used to prevent implementation of an agency
rule that “would constitute a serious threat to the public interest,
safety, or welfare.”32
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief history of
the formation and functioning of JCAR, gives an overview of JCAR’s
role in the rulemaking process in Illinois, and briefly explains why
JCAR’s legislative veto powers are unlikely to be constitutional.33
Part III gathers and presents data about agency rulemaking and
JCAR activity since the Committee began operation in 1978.34 The
data reveal several interesting things, including that the overall volume of rulemaking as well as the volume of emergency rulemaking
have declined over time. It also shows that JCAR’s interaction with
agencies has shifted from being fundamentally advisory and cooperative to coercive in nature. This shift is apparently due to a combination of Committee funding cutbacks and the enhanced prohibition,
suspension and veto powers given to JCAR by the General Assembly.
Part IV looks more particularly at the fifty-seven prohibitions of proposed rules and suspensions of emergency rules issued by JCAR since
September 2004, which was when JCAR was first authorized to kill
agency rules by itself.35 Review of JCAR’s minutes and other public
documents makes clear that JCAR has used its prohibition and suspension powers without regard to the statutory provisions that authorize their use only when implementation of the rules would pose a
serious threat to the health, safety, or welfare of the public. Part V
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part IV.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(a) (2014).
infra notes 37–113 and accompanying text.
infra Part III.
infra notes 118–90 and accompanying text.
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recommends against amending the Illinois constitution in a way that
would reinstitute a legislative veto system in the state.36
II.

JCAR

AND

RULEMAKING

IN

ILLINOIS

This Part provides a brief overview of JCAR’s creation and the
gradual expansion of its powers from 1978 until today. It also provides an overview of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Illinois APA)37 as well as the rulemaking process in Illinois and JCAR’s
role in it. Finally, it briefly explains why JCAR’s veto powers likely
violate the Illinois constitution.
A. JCAR’s Creation
The Illinois General Assembly created JCAR in 1977 as a small,
bipartisan committee with modest powers to oversee agency rulemaking.38 At the time, there was already a sprawling bureaucracy in Illinois, including sixty-five major agencies and a variety of smaller
boards and commissions.39 Out of concern that the state was increasingly relying on these agencies and that the “traditional notion of separation of powers” was being lost,40 JCAR was designed to restore the
General Assembly’s control over agency regulation.
JCAR’s initial role was simply to oversee the agency rulemaking
process in an inform-and-advise capacity,41 assuring that all proposed
rules were in proper form, that the promulgating agency had given
sufficient notice to the public prior to adoption of any proposed rule,
and that the agency was at all times acting within its statutory authority.42 If JCAR had concerns about the propriety of a proposed rule,
or about a rule that had been enacted outside of the usual procedures
in an emergency situation, it was authorized to convey its concerns to
the agency proposing the rule in an effort to seek a modification or
withdrawal of the rule.43 If these efforts were unsuccessful, JCAR
36. See infra Part V.
37. Illinois Administrative Procedure Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1 to 100/15-10 (2014).
38. See 1977 Ill. Laws 3040, 3045 (currently codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-90(a) (2014)).
The composition of JCAR was to be twelve members of the General Assembly, with three each
chosen by the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate. Id. See Falkoff, supra
note 3, at 1063–76, for a detailed history of the creation and development of JCAR.
39. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 447 (1986).
40. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1979) [hereinafter 1978
JCAR REPORT].
41. 1977 Ill. Laws at 3046 (stating that JCAR is to possess “advisory powers only relating to its
function”).
42. Id. at 3047.
43. Id.

R
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could propose corrective legislation to the General Assembly.44
Therefore, JCAR initially had no authority to delay in any way the
implementation of an agency’s rules.
JCAR itself believed that its noncoercive oversight powers were effective. In its first year of operation, the committee reported that although it had reviewed nearly five hundred proposed rules and found
“serious problems” with more than one-third of them, informal discussions with the agencies and the threat of legislation had brought
about a resolution to most of its concerns.45 The committee therefore
seemed to possess adequate powers to accomplish its primary purpose
of promoting both “adequate and proper rules by agencies and an understanding on the part of the public respecting such rules.”46
Nonetheless, the Committee almost immediately lobbied for more
power over agency rulemaking, and in 1980 the General Assembly
gave JCAR authority to temporarily prohibit implementation of proposed rules (or suspend the effect of newly implemented emergency
rules) by a vote of three-fifths of the committee.47 JCAR’s prohibition or suspension was temporary—it could only last 180 days—
though the General Assembly could by joint resolution make the prohibition or suspension permanent.48 Whether constitutional or not,
the statute therefore provided the General Assembly with a legislative
veto, since joint resolutions required no presentment to the Governor.
During the first year in which the veto was available to the General
Assembly, “virtually all” of the rules that JCAR reviewed were modified by the promulgating agencies in response to JCAR comments.49
In the early years of the twenty-first century, JCAR’s powers were
significantly enhanced when the General Assembly amended the Illinois APA to grant JCAR authority to issue its own veto.50 The measure had been proposed and hastily passed, at a time when
Blagojevich’s relationship with the General Assembly was in steep de44. Id. at 3048.
45. 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 40, at 17–18, 22. See generally https://archive.org/
search.php?query=joint%20committee%20on%20administrative%20rules%20annual%20report%20AND%20mediatype%3Atexts&sort=-date (accessed by a search for annual
reports in the internet archive index) (listing all of the JCAR annual reports).
46. See 1977 Ill. Laws at 3046.
47. See 1980 Ill. Laws 3898, 3900 (codified as amended at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115
(2014)). The law was passed over a gubernatorial veto.
48. Id.
49. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 28 (1982) [hereinafter 1981 JCAR REPORT].
50. See 2004 Ill. Laws 4328, 4328–29 (codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(c)).
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cline.51 As one lawmaker remarked, this “was one of those significant
Bills that actually never went through the legislative process, so we
haven’t had a chance to debate it. I understand it surfaced yesterday
for the first time.”52 The lawmaker also observed that “[w]e are so
caught up in the personalities of the Governor and the Legislature
that we’re not even seeing straight about the relationship between
these two branches.”53
Moving forward, JCAR could respond in one of a variety of ways to
proposed rulemaking from an agency (or to an emergency rule that
had already gone into effect). JCAR could: (1) issue a letter of no
objection; (2) make recommendations to the agency for modifications
of its rule; (3) object to the rule (which would allow the agency to
move ahead with the rule, but which would result in a notice being
published in the Illinois Register stating JCAR’s objection); or (4)
prohibit publication of the rule (or suspend implementation of an
emergency rule), which would permanently kill the rule unless the
General Assembly passed a Joint Resolution overriding the JCAR action.54 The effect was to turn a General Assembly veto into a legislative committee veto that could be exercised by a group of just eight
legislators.55
B. JCAR’s Role in the Illinois Rulemaking Process
JCAR is only one part of the rulemaking apparatus in Illinois. The
state currently has eighty-eight state agencies,56 and, with some exceptions, each of these agencies may produce rules and regulations when
authorized to do so by the General Assembly. When creating rules,
the agencies must comply with the procedures described in the Illinois
APA, which include multiple points of interaction with JCAR.

51. See generally S. Transcript at 31, S.B. 73, 93rd Gen Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2004) (adopting
the amendments to Ill. S.B. 73, which amended the Illinois APA).
52. H.R. REP. NO. 93-166, at 31 (Ill. 2004) (quoting Rep. Julie Hamos).
53. Id. at 32 (quoting Rep. Julie Hamos).
54. See generally infra notes 56–84 and accompanying text (describing JCAR’s powers in more
detail).
55. A JCAR prohibition or suspension of a rule still requires a three-fifths vote of the entire
committee, meaning at least eight members. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.100/5-115(a). The JCAR veto
went into effect on September 10, 2004. See 2004 Ill. Laws 4328 (codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
100/5-115).
56. For the complete list, see State Agencies, ST. ILL. HOME, https://www2.illinois.gov/pages/
agencies.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
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The default procedures for creating rules—the “general rulemaking” requirements57—can be time consuming, in large part because
the Illinois APA provides significant opportunity for public comment
and legislative review of the proposed rules. Proposed rules must go
through a two-step process that takes at least ninety days to complete
and may take as much as a year. First, the agency must give forty-five
days notice of its intended action to the public.58 During this period,
the agency must take oral and written comments from the public and
hold a public hearing if the agency deems it necessary—or if there has
been a request by the Governor, JCAR, an association representing
more than one-hundred persons, twenty-five individuals, or a local
government.59 Also during this time, the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity reviews each proposed rule to determine its possible impact on small businesses.60
Following the first notice period, the agency must then give a “second notice” to JCAR, initiating legislative review by the JCAR staff
and then by members of the committee.61 By statute, JCAR is to review each proposed rule to determine whether it is within the statutory authority upon which it is based, whether it is in proper form, and
whether adequate notice was given of the purpose and effect of the
rule.62 In addition, JCAR “may consider whether the agency has considered alternatives to the rule” that would “minimize the economic
impact on small businesses.”63
The second notice period expires after forty-five days unless JCAR
and the agency agree to extend the notice period.64 With the conclusion of the second notice period, JCAR is to act in one of a handful of
ways. It may issue a “certificate of no objection,” which authorizes
the agency to file a copy of the rule with the Illinois Secretary of State
57. The procedure is sometimes referred to as “regular rulemaking” or “permanent rulemaking.” JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2015) [hereinafter 2014 JCAR
REPORT].
58. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-40(b). The agency must make available: (1) the text of the proposed rule or amendment; (2) a citation to the statute that authorized the agency to promulgate
the rule; (3) a description of the rule’s subjects and the issues it addresses; (4) a description of
the studies or reports on which the agency relied; (5) a regulatory flexibility analysis; (6) and the
time, place, and manner in which interested persons may offer comments on the rule. Id.
59. Id.
60. 2014 JCAR REPORT, supra note 57, at 6.
61. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-40(c).
62. Id. at 100/5-110(a).
63. Id. The Illinois APA requires agencies to engage in an economic and regulatory impact
analysis of any rules that might have an effect on small businesses, nonprofit corporations, or
small municipalities to demonstrate that they have considered less stringent or costly alternatives. Id. at 100/5-30(a).
64. Id. at 100/5-40(c).
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for publication in the Illinois Register. The rule will then go into effect unless a later effective date was specified in the rule.65 JCAR
might also issue a “[r]ecommendation” along with its certificate of no
objection, in which case the agency should respond to the recommendation within ninety days, though it can also modify or withdraw the
rule.66 Whether or not JCAR issues a recommendation along with its
certificate of no objection, the agency may proceed to file the rule
with the Secretary of State without making any modifications.
JCAR may, however, decide to certify an objection to the agency’s
proposed rule.67 The Illinois APA does not explicitly provide relevant
grounds for an objection, though scattered provisions of the Act authorize JCAR to: (1) evaluate a proposed rule’s “propriety, legal adequacy, relation to statutory authorization, economic and budgetary
effects, and public policy”;68 (2) “review the statutory authority on
which any administrative rule is based” and to “suggest rulemaking”
when it “determines that the agency’s rules are incomplete, inconsistent, or otherwise deficient”;69 and (3) determine whether the rule is
“within the statutory authority upon which it is based,” whether it is in
the “proper form,” whether “notice was given . . . sufficient to give
adequate notice of the purpose and effect of the rule,” and whether
the agency “considered alternatives . . . designed to minimize economic impact on small businesses.”70
If JCAR objects to a proposed rule, the agency must respond in
writing to JCAR’s objection within ninety days, explaining whether it
will modify the proposed rule, withdraw it in its entirety, or refuse to
modify or withdraw the rule.71 If the agency refuses to modify or
withdraw the proposed rule, it can proceed to publish it with the Secretary of State, but it must also submit a notice of its refusal for publi65. Id. at 100/5-40(d).
66. See 2014 JCAR REPORT, supra note 57, at 7. Modification or withdrawal by the agency
during the second notice period cannot be done unilaterally without this JCAR recommendation. Id.
67. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-110(b).
68. Id. at 100/5-100(c).
69. Id. at 100/5-105(b), (d).
70. Id. at 100/5-110(a). Not included in the statutory cross-reference, but frequently considered by JCAR in its review of proposed rules, is the statutory requirement that each rule that
“implements a discretionary power to be exercised by an agency” include the standards the
agency must use when exercising the power. Id. at 100/5-20. In addition, the “standards shall be
stated as precisely and clearly as practicable under the conditions to inform fully those persons
affected.” Id.
71. Id. at 100/5-110(c). No rule may go into effect until the agency has responded to JCAR’s
objection. Id. at 100/5-110(h). Failure of the agency to respond altogether “shall constitute withdrawal of the proposed rule.” Id. at 100/5-110(f).
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cation in the Illinois Register.72 JCAR may then decide whether to
recommend legislative action to the General Assembly in response to
an agency refusal.73
In each of these instances, the agency may have its proposed rule
take effect notwithstanding JCAR’s misgivings. But in some circumstances the Illinois APA allows JCAR to prohibit entirely the implementation of a proposed rule. To do so, JCAR must, by a three-fifths
vote of its members, determine two things: first, that the proposed
rule “would be objectionable” under certain statutorily enumerated
standards;74 and second, that the proposed rule “would constitute a
serious threat to the public interest, safety, or welfare.”75 Left unexplained in the statute is what would constitute such a serious threat, an
issue to be discussed infra.76
If JCAR issues a statement of prohibition of a proposed rule, it may
not be published by the Secretary of State or enforced by the agency
unless either the statement is withdrawn or the General Assembly
passes a joint resolution to discontinue the prohibition within 180
days.77 In effect, therefore, JCAR has a veto over administrative
agency rulemaking, subject only to override by the full General Assembly. Prior to September 2004, JCAR’s authority to prohibit implementation of a rule was only temporary; it would remain in effect for
180 days and become permanent only upon passage of joint resolution
by the General Assembly.78
The Illinois APA allows agencies in some circumstances to avoid
the two-step notice provisions required for ordinary rulemaking. For
example, agencies need not use the general rulemaking procedures to
pass “required” rules, which are mandated by the Illinois APA and
include descriptive information about the agency.79 Likewise, peremptory” rules—which include any rules that are: (1) ‘required as a
72. Id. at 100/5-110(g).
73. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-110(g).
74. Id. at 100/5-115(a) (referencing the standards for general rulemaking, which are specified
in Sections 100/5-100, 100/5-105, and 100/5-110 of Title 5 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes); see
supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (encapsulating these standards).
75. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(a).
76. See infra notes 125–54 and accompanying text.
77. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(b).
78. 1980 Ill. Laws 3898, 3900.
79. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-15(b). More particularly, the Illinois APA requires agencies
to maintain as rules a current description of its organization; charts depicting the organization;
current procedures by which the public can obtain information or make submissions or requests
on subjects, programs, and activities of the agency; tables of contents, indices, reference tables
and other materials to aid users in finding and using the agency’s collection of rules currently in
force; and a current description of the agency’s rulemaking procedures with necessary flow
charts depicting those procedures. Id. at 100/5-15(a).
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result of federal law, federal rules and regulations, an order of a court,
or a collective bargaining agreement;” (2) that must be promulgated
under conditions that “preclude compliance with the general rulemaking requirements;” and (3) that “preclude the exercise of discretion by
the agency as to the content of the rule”—need not navigate the ordinary rulemaking procedures.80
The final category of rulemaking is for “emergency” rules. As defined by the Illinois APA, an “‘[e]mergency’ means the existence of
any situation that any agency finds reasonably constitutes a threat to
the public interest, safety, or welfare.”81 Emergency rulemaking is far
more common than the other types of rulemaking that are exempted
from the default first and second notice procedures set forth in the
Illinois APA. An agency may adopt a rule without following the notice procedures when it finds an emergency that requires passage in
less time than is required by the general rulemaking procedures.82
Emergency rules may become effective immediately upon being filed
with the Secretary of State, but generally cannot be in effect for more
than 150 days.83
Although the general rulemaking procedures need not be followed
for required, peremptory, exempt, or emergency rules before they
take effect, all of those rules remain subject to review by JCAR after
taking effect, under the same standards used for review of proposed
general rulemaking. Thus, JCAR may offer no objections, it may
make recommendations, it may object, or it may suspend operation of
the rules that were put into effect outside of the ordinary procedures
by the agency.84

80. Id. at 100/5-50. Pursuant to the Illinois Emergency Management Act, another small category of rules—those promulgated by the Pollution Control Board and the Illinois Emergency
Management Agency—may be adopted without following the usual procedures, because these
rules are identical in substance to federal regulations that the state is already required to adopt
and enforce. See 2014 JCAR REPORT, supra note 57, at 5. See generally Illinois Emergency
Management Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3005/1–/22 (2014).
81. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-45(a).
82. Id. at 100/5-45(b). To utilize the emergency rulemaking procedure, the agency must file a
notice of emergency rulemaking with the Secretary of State and must “take reasonable and
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to the persons who may be affected by
them.” Id. The rule becomes effective “immediately upon filing . . . or at a stated date less than
10 days thereafter.” Id.
83. Id. at 100/5-45(b)–(c). There are, however, many provisions passed by the General Assembly authorizing temporary emergency rulemaking and extending times. See id. at 100/545(c).
84. Id. at 100/5-120.
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C. JCAR’s Dubious Constitutionality
Before proceeding to an analysis of JCAR and agency activity, it is
worthwhile to acknowledge that there is good reason to question the
constitutionality of the legislative veto that JCAR has possessed since
late 2004.85 A comprehensive analysis of the constitutionality of the
legislative veto has been presented elsewhere,86 but this Section provides an overview of the argument.
The Illinois courts have never directly ruled on the constitutionality
of the legislative veto.87 But in the federal system, legislative vetoes
have been deemed to violate the U.S. Constitution,88 and with only
one exception legislative veto schemes have likewise been deemed unconstitutional under state constitutions.89 Although opinions from
85. When the JCAR staff originally proposed amending the Illinois APA to provide JCAR
with a veto, it acknowledged that this legislation “could raise constitutional questions about separation of powers” and “would result in the most serious legal issues[,]” including “whether
passage of a resolution can affect law, [because] it eliminates the approval of the Governor
required under normal legislative lawmaking.” JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, 1979 ANNUAL
REPORT 395–96 (1980).
86. See, e.g., Falkoff, supra note 3, at 1063–76.
87. Although the constitutionality of JCAR’s review of agency rulemaking has on occasion
been challenged, the legislative veto has never properly been before the court. See, e.g., Quinn
v. Donnewald, 483 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ill. 1985) (explaining that the issue of an “illegal legislative
veto of an executive action . . . is not before us”); Reece v. Bd. of Educ., 767 N.E.2d 395, 402–03
(Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“[T]he issue of whether [a contested] action would constitute a legislative
veto is not before us.”); see also Falkoff, supra note 3, at 1105–07 (discussing the consequences of
Quinn on the constitutionality of legislative veto schemes in Illinois).
88. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276 (1991) (holding that Congress may exercise legislative power only in
conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Section 7 of Article I of the
U.S. Constitution); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (holding that a one-House legislative veto violated the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the U.S. Constitution);
see also Falkoff, supra note 3, at 1076–91 (discussing at length the legislative veto in the constitutional context).
89. In states that allow a legislative committee or one House to exercise veto power, bicameralism failures have doomed the schemes. See, e.g., Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H.
1981); Gillam Cty. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality, 849 P.2d 500, 505 (Or. 1993) (en banc), rev’d on
other grounds, Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality, 876 P.2d 749, 750 (Or. 1994); State
ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 632 (W. Va. 1981); cf. Martinez v. Dep’t of Indus.,
Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582, 586 (Wis. 1992); Honorable Marvin York, Okl.
A.G. Opin. No. 86-17, 1986 WL 235082, at *1, *2 (Feb. 24, 1986). In states where joint resolutions are required for legislative vetoes, the constitutional problem includes a failure to comply
with the requirement of presentment to the governor for a potential executive veto. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 638 (Kan. 1984); Op. of the
Justices to the Senate, 493 N.E.2d 859, 863–64 (Mass. 1986); Blank v. Dep’t of Corr., 611 N.W.2d
530, 536 (Mich. 2000); Mo. Coal. for the Env’t v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125,
133 (Mo. 1997) (en banc); Op. of the Justices, 431 A.2d, at 788; Gilliam Cty., 849 P.2d at 505–06;
Commonwealth v. Jubelirer, 567 A.2d 741, 749 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1989), vacated as moot by 614
A.2d 204, 211 (Pa. 1992); Barker, 279 S.E.2d at 632; Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 583; cf. Carmel
Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. California, 20 P.3d 533, 542 (Cal. 2001) (noting that a legislative review
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federal and state courts and from attorneys general nationwide are of
course not binding on the Illinois courts,90 both the compelling nature
of their reasoning and their near unanimity bode ill for the Illinois
legislative veto scheme if it is ever properly challenged in the courts.
There are two sets of potential constitutional difficulties with the
legislative veto scheme in Illinois. The first is that JCAR vetoes of
agency rulemaking may violate the stand-alone separation of powers
provisions of the Illinois constitution, with the General Assembly encroaching on the powers properly belonging to either the executive or
judicial branches (or both). The second is that JCAR vetoes fail to
comply with the enactment provisions of the state constitution, including the requirements that legislation be passed by both houses of the
General Assembly and be presented to the Governor for a potential
executive veto before taking effect. This Section briefly addresses
each set of issues.
1. Separation-of-Powers Issues
Article II of the Illinois constitution states that “[t]he legislative,
executive and judicial branches are separate,” and that “[n]o branch
shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.”91 To be sure,
the state constitution does not envision an absolute segregation of
powers among the three branches of government.92 But the core
scheme “would be unconstitutional if it permitted a single house of the Legislature to suspend a
departmental mandate without . . . presentment to the Governor”). Idaho is the only state in
which a legislative veto scheme was upheld by the courts as constitutional. See Mead v. Arnell,
791 P.2d 410, 412 n.2 (Idaho 1990) (quoting State Gen. Assemb. v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 448
(N.J. 1982)). For a comprehensive review of these nationwide decisions, see Falkoff, supra note
3, at 1083–91.
90. Relsolelo v. Fisk, 760 N.E.2d 963, 967 (Ill. 2001) (“[W]e are not bound to interpret our
own constitutional provisions lockstep with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal
constitution.”); Ray Schools-Chicago, Inc. v. Cummins, 146 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ill. 1957) (“[W]here
Federal questions are not involved, as where State constitutions and statutes are to be construed,
State courts are not required to follow Federal court decisions although they may be
persuasive.”).
91. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1. The modern language was first adopted in 1941, but reflects in
substance the original provision from the original Illinois Constitution in 1818. See ILL CONST.
OF 1818, art. I (“The powers of the government of the State of Illinois, shall be divided into three
distinct departments, and each of them be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit:
Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are
judiciary, to another. No person, or collection of persons, being one of those departments, shall
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly
directed or permitted.”).
92. Pucinski v. Cty. of Cook, 737 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. 2000) (noting that the provision “does
not create rigid boundaries prohibiting every exercise of functions by one branch of government
which ordinarily are exercised by another”); Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ill. 1997)
(noting that the purpose is not to “achieve a complete divorce between the branches of government”); Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 92 N.E. 814, 833 (Ill. 1910) (noting that branches cannot
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functions of one department cannot be exercised by one of the others
because “[e]ach branch of government has its own unique sphere of
authority that cannot be exercised by another branch.”93
Although the state constitution does not define the powers of the
three branches,94 the courts have described the legislative power as
“the power to enact laws or declare what laws shall be”;95 the executive power as “the power which compels obedience to the laws and
executes them”;96 and the judicial power as “the power which adjudicates upon the rights of citizens, and to that end construes and applies
the law.”97
There are two ways in which the JCAR veto power over agency
rulemaking might contravene state separation-of-powers principles.
First, since JCAR is given veto power over executive agency action,
the committee’s interference with agency rulemaking arguably intrudes on the executive branch’s power to enforce laws. This argument has occasionally been successful in challenges to legislative veto
schemes in other states.98 But the argument depends on a characterization of rulemaking as fundamentally “executive” in nature, a doubtful proposition given that the power to create rules is inherent in the
legislature and resides in an executive agency only if the legislature
chooses to delegate it.99 Although the enforcement of rules is inher“be kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no connection or interdependence”); Field v.
People ex rel. McClernand, 3 Ill. 79, 83–84 (1839) (explaining that the separation-of-powers provision is “a declaration of a fundamental principle” but must “be understood in a limited and
qualified sense”).
93. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078 (Ill. 1997) (holding as unconstitutional
the attempted delegation of an executive or administrative function to the judicial branch).
94. People v. Hammond, 959 N.E.2d 29, 44 (Ill. 2011) (“Our constitution does not attempt to
define legislative, executive and judicial power, as it is neither practicable nor possible to enumerate the myriad powers of government and to declare that a given power belongs exclusively
to one branch for all time.”); Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078 (“[O]ur state constitution does not define
legislative, executive, and judicial power” (citing People v. Walker, 519 N.E.2d 890, 892 (Ill.
1988))).
95. See, e.g., People v. Hawkinson, 155 N.E. 318, 319 (Ill. 1927).
96. See, e.g., Witter v. Cook Cty. Comm’rs, 100 N.E. 148, 149 (Ill. 1912).
97. Hawkinson, 155 N.E. at 319.
98. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 635 (Kan.
1984) (“[T]he power to adopt rules and regulations is essentially executive or administrative in
nature, not legislative.”); Commonwealth v. Jubelirer, 567 A.2d 741, 749 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1989)
(holding that a legislative veto interfered with the executive’s responsibility to administer the
law, and “[n]othing less than legislation may suffice to override the rule-making power of . . .
[any] executive agency”), vacated as moot by 614 A.2d 204, 211 (Pa. 1992).
99. Monsanto Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 367 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ill. 1977) (characterizing
rulemaking as “quasi-legislative” in nature); Radaszewski v. Garner, 805 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004); Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 684 N.E.2d 837, 840–41
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Commerce Comm’n, 644 N.E.2d 817, 821 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994).
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ently an executive function,100 it is not immediately clear why the promulgation of rules would likewise be.
A more difficult question is raised by the possibility that legislative
vetoes of agency rulemaking interfere with the judicial powers to construe the law. After all, JCAR’s authority to veto proposed rules is
premised on its legal determination that the agency acted beyond its
statutory authority.101 But that activity overlaps, at the very least,
with the work of judging, and the Illinois courts have indeed often
been called on to determine whether or not an agency has acted in
conformity with statute.102 If “the legislature’s role [is] to make the
law” and “the judiciary’s role [is] to interpret the law,”103 then it is
difficult to ignore that a legislative committee sitting in judgment on
the lawfulness of an agency’s rules at least raises serious questions
about legislative encroachment on the judicial powers.
2. Enactment Issues
While there may be more or less merit to separation-of-powers arguments against the constitutionality of the JCAR veto, it is difficult
to see how legislative vetoes can survive challenges based on the General Assembly’s failure to respect the enactment provisions of the Illinois constitution. Killing an agency’s rules through a legislative veto
raises two distinct constitutional problems. First, if the General Assembly effectuated the veto by joint resolution (as was allowed until
September 2004), the action could be deemed a violation of the requirement that legislation be presented to the Governor for a potential veto before it could take effect. Second, if the veto was brought
about by JCAR alone (as is currently allowed), there is in addition a
failure to comply with the bicameralism requirement of the
constitution.
Resolutions, of course, are not laws. Instead, they are “ways of expressing opinions or doing a variety of things except enacting laws.”104
Whether passed jointly or by a single house of the General Assembly,
100. S. 51 Dev. Corp. v. Vega, 781 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
101. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-110(a) (2014) (“The Joint Committee shall examine any
proposed rule . . . to determine whether the proposed rule . . . is within the statutory authority
upon which it is based.”).
102. See, e.g., Granite City Div. of Nat’l Steel Co. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 613 N.E.2d 719,
724 (Ill. 1993); People v. Roos, 514 N.E.2d 993, 998 (Ill. 1987); Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv., 644 N.E.2d
817.
103. Bates v. Bd. of Educ., 555 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1990) (citing Roth v. Yackley, 396 N.E.2d 520
(Ill. 1979)).
104. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT, PREFACE TO LAWMAKING, ch. 3, at 1 (2010) (emphasis
added).
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resolutions can have no binding legal effect. As the Illinois Supreme
Court has explained,
nothing becomes law simply and solely because men who possess
the legislative power will that it shall be, unless they express their
determination to that effect in the mode pointed out by the instrument which invests them with the power, and under all the forms
which that instrument has rendered essential.105

Instead, the General Assembly may make laws only by passing
bills,106 and to be lawful those bills must comply with the enactment
requirements set forth in Sections 8 and 9 of Article 4 of the Illinois
constitution. Chief among these are the bicameralism and presentment requirements: “No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each house,”107 and
“[e]very bill passed by the General Assembly shall be presented to the
Governor within 30 calendar days after its passage.”108
The legislative review schemes that have been in place since 1981
are incompatible with these provisions. When the General Assembly
was authorized to vote by joint resolution to permanently suspend an
agency rule to which JCAR objected, the legislative body was given
license to alter the legal rights and duties of those entities that would
have been governed by the agency’s rules. Because the General Assembly veto could be accomplished by resolution (rather than by passage of a bill that was presented to the governor of the state for a
potential executive veto), the legislative act could not—should not—
have had the force of law.109
Similarly, if JCAR were to object to an agency rule and suspend its
implementation and the General Assembly subsequently failed to lift
the JCAR suspension (thereby making the suspension permanent),
not only would the legislature have failed to comply with the presentment requirement, but it would have also failed to meet the bicameralism requirement of the Illinois constitution.110
In addition, General Assembly or JCAR vetoes of agency rulemaking do not comply with a host of other requirements specified in the
105. People ex rel. Burritt v. Comm’rs of State Contracts, 11 N.E. 180, 188 (Ill. 1887) (quoting
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 156 (5th ed. 1883)).
106. ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 8(b); LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT, supra note 104, ch. 2, at 7
(“Laws can be enacted only by bills—not by resolutions or other measures.”).
107. ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 8(c).
108. Id. at art. 4, § 9(a).
109. See State Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 444 (N.J. 1982); see also State v.
A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 772 (Alaska 1980) (holding that the legislature must follow
the enactment provisions, or else they would serve no purpose).
110. See ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 8(c).
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Illinois constitution for the passage of bills by the legislature, including
the requirement that laws contain an enacting clause,111 that the final
passage of a bill be done by record vote,112 that the bill be read by title
on three different days in each house, and that it “be reproduced and
placed on the desk of each member.”113
III.

AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

ON

JCAR ACTIVITY SINCE 1978

As the foregoing overview of the Illinois APA and its rulemaking
procedures makes clear, JCAR has been authorized to play an increasingly intrusive role in the oversight of rulemaking in Illinois.
This Part gathers and presents data to shed some light on the nature
of JCAR’s interventions in agency rulemaking over the years. In particular, the data show that both total agency rulemaking and “emergency” rulemaking (for which agencies do not follow the usual noticeand-comment requirements) have decreased over time, which may
possibly be a result of JCAR’s oversight of the process. More importantly, the data reveal a profound shift in the manner in which JCAR
interacts with agencies, with the body increasingly relying on coercive
rather than collaborative methods to modify agency rulemaking.
At the outset, it should be noted that the data presented below describe the number of individual rulemaking “filings” made by agencies. In the charts and figures, no effort is made to distinguish filings
that are lengthy and complex from those that are short and direct. As
JCAR explained in its first annual report, “each rulemaking is viewed
as a unit, although they differ widely in length, complexity, nature and
importance. A rulemaking may vary from a simple amendment

111. Id. at art. 4, § 8(a) (“Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in
the General Assembly.”).
112. Id. at art. 4, § 8(c).
113. Id. at art. 4, § 8(d). An argument that has been offered against the foregoing analysis is
that the enactment requirements of the Illinois constitution are nonetheless satisfied, because
the statutes that created the General Assembly and JCAR legislative veto regime were duly
passed by the legislature as ordinary bills with bicameralism, presentment and all other constitutional enactment provisions respected. See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 40, Caro ex
rel. State v. Blagojevich, 895 N.E.2d 1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (No. 08-1061), 2008 WL 8201149.
Courts in other states have rejected this argument on the grounds that a legislature should not be
allowed to use a statute to delegate to itself powers that it is not constitutionally authorized to
possess, even with the acquiescence of the governor. See, e.g., A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d at
777; State ex rel. Stephan v. Kan. House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622, 637 (Kan. 1984);
Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Ky. 1984); Blank v. Dep’t of Corr.,
611 N.W.2d 530, 560 (Mich. 2000); Mo. Coal. for the Env’t v. Joint Comm. on Admin. Rules, 948
S.W.2d 125, 134 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
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changing a few words in an agency’s rules to hundreds of pages of new
regulations.”114
Since 1978, JCAR has published annual reports summarizing
agency rulemaking activity and JCAR’s responses.115 By aggregating
the data found in the reports, trends can be discerned both in the volume of agency rulemaking and in the manner in which JCAR has endeavored to influence agency action. Several findings emerge from
the data. First, the volume of agency rulemaking has decreased, albeit
intermittently, during JCAR’s tenure. While it is impossible to know
how much (if at all) JCAR is responsible for the decreasing number of
“ordinary” and “emergency” rules over the past several decades (or
whether such a decrease has been good or bad for the public), it is
reasonable to hypothesize that the legislative committee’s scrutiny of
agency rulemaking has contributed to a more efficient rulemaking
regime.
The data also reveal that JCAR has grown increasingly interventionist in its interaction with agencies. As discussed supra, JCAR was
originally created as an advisory committee that was expected to
make recommendations to agencies for improving their rules, and in
exceptional cases to inform the General Assembly about outlier
rulemaking in order to initiate corrective legislation.116 But the data
reveals, perhaps not surprisingly, that as JCAR was granted increasingly coercive powers by the General Assembly, it largely eschewed
the cooperative formal processes at its disposal. JCAR instead now
chiefly operates by wielding its prohibition and suspension powers.
These observations are striking in light of the doubtful constitutionality of JCAR’s legislative veto powers.
As can be seen in the following figures, agencies in Illinois are responsible for the production of a tremendous volume of rules. Between 1978 and 2014, approximately 130 agencies proposed (or, in
putative emergencies, implemented) a total of 21,289 rules. Figure 1
reflects the annual output of general, emergency, peremptory, exempt,
and required rulemaking by all agencies, and shows that while the
number of rules promulgated by agencies rose gradually until reaching
its peak in 1986, since then, the volume has decreased significantly.
114. 1978 JCAR REPORT, supra note 40, at 17. All of the numbers presented in the following
figures were gathered from the JCAR annual reports from 1978 to 2014. They were tabulated
directly from the reports’ detailed discussions rather than from its summary tables, since the
summary tables do not break down information annually between 1978 and 1990, and were
sometimes inaccurate.
115. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-140 (2014) (mandating the filing of annual reports with the
General Assembly).
116. Infra notes 136–42 and accompanying text.
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AGENCIES

Note: Figure 1 depicts all rules proposed or implemented by all Illinois agencies annually between 1978 and 2014. The data have been collected from JCAR’s annual reports. There is a
noticeable decline in rulemaking volume that becomes especially marked after 2004 (indicated
by the scored vertical line), which is when JCAR was given veto powers by the General
Assembly.

Broadly speaking, Figure 1 shows a trend over time toward less total
rulemaking. Agencies consistently produced 600 or more rules annually from 1978 to 2004, approaching or exceeding 700 rules per year
eleven times. While the average volume of rulemaking trended somewhat downward during that period, the steepest drops began in 2005,
with closer to 400 to 500 rules produced annually during the ten years
from 2005 to 2014. This latter period corresponds with the JCAR veto
era, during which the committee has held veto power over agency
rulemaking.
Most of the rules produced by agencies have been of the “ordinary”
or “general” type, meaning that the agencies that created the rules
used the ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures required by the Illinois APA. Of the 21,289 rules produced by agencies
between 1978 and 2014, fully 18,009, or 84.6%, were “ordinary” rules.
Whether ordinary or emergency, JCAR has reviewed nearly all of
these rules during its tenure, as can be seen in Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2. RULES OF ALL KINDS PROPOSED BY AGENCIES
REVIEWED BY JCAR ANNUALLY, 1991 TO 2014

VERSUS

Note: Figure 2 shows that JCAR has been diligent in its responsibility for reviewing agency
rulemaking. The figure does not report data back to 1978 because JCAR did not begin reporting
on the number of rules it reviewed until its 1992 annual report. The number of rules JCAR
reviews in a given year will never match the number of rules produced by agencies because rules
produced late in the calendar year will not be reviewed by the committee in time to be noted in
the annual report.

Beyond providing context for the volume of agency rulemaking and
JCAR review from 1978 to 2014, data collected from JCAR’s annual
reports also sheds light on the type of activity in which JCAR has
engaged over the years. As noted earlier, JCAR was initially conceived as a body whose purpose was to work collaboratively with
agencies, even though JCAR early in its existence was granted coercive delay powers by the General Assembly. As the following figures
show, through roughly 1990 JCAR largely relied on its noncoercive
powers to influence agency rulemaking, typically deploying recommendations (which an agency could ignore without penalty) or objections (for which the only consequence of ignoring would be a
publication of a notice of JCAR’s discontent in the Illinois Register).
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Note: Figure 3 shows the number of recommendations JCAR annually issued for rules of all
kinds. Recommendations are noncoercive because agencies may choose to publish the rules
without modification and suffer no penalty. There is no data indicated prior to 1985 because
JCAR first gathered numbers on recommendations in its 1986 annual report. The left-most
scored vertical line at 1990 marks the year that JCAR reported a sharp decline in the committee’s operating budget, which may account for the subsequent drop in JCAR recommendations.

Although it does not include data on the number of recommendations issued by JCAR until 1985, Figure 3 shows that JCAR issued a
high number of noncoercive recommendations annually through 1990,
twice hitting nearly eighty per year and topping out at ninety-two in
1986. In contrast, the volume of recommendations from 1991 to 2014
typically remained below twenty per year, averaging 15.5 annually
during this span. Figure 4 similarly shows that JCAR used its objection powers far more often in its early years than it would after 1990,
averaging 69.2 objections per year between 1978 and 1990, and just
17.6 objections per year from 1990 to 2014.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL301.txt

974

unknown

Seq: 26

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 4. JCAR OBJECTIONS FOR RULES
ANNUALLY, 1978 TO 2014

17-OCT-16

9:27

[Vol. 65:949
OF

ALL KINDS

Note: Figure 4 shows the number of objections JCAR annually issued for rules of all kinds. As
with the number of recommendations, the volume of objections declined to very low numbers
after 1990. Objections can also be considered noncoercive (or at most minimally coercive) since
agencies may implement their rules without modification, with the only consequence being that
notice of JCAR’s objections will be published in the Illinois Register.

Taken together, Figures 3 and 4 reveal that for a little more than a
decade after its formation, JCAR made extensive use of its formal
recommendation and objection powers, but that beginning in 1991 the
number of recommendations and objections issued by JCAR dropped
off to nominal levels. Lest the decline be thought an artifact of a reduction in rulemaking by the agencies, Figure 5 combines the data and
shows that from 1985 to 1990, JCAR either issued recommendations
or objected to rules fully 30.8% of the time on average, while from
1991 to 2014, that rate dropped to only 6.3%.
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TO

Note: Figure 5 shows the annual percentage of rules by all Illinois agencies for which JCAR
either made a formal recommendation or entered an objection between 1985 and 2014. From
1991 to 2014, the average combined rate of recommendations and objections was five times
lower than the average rate from 1985 to 1990.

The sharp turn in JCAR recommendation and objection activity
around 1991 initially seems puzzling because the General Assembly
did not modify the statutory grant of power to JCAR in any manner
around that time. But a clue to what was happening can be found in
JCAR’s annual report for 1991—which itself was not issued until
1996—in which the committee explained that the “fiscal restraints
under which the State has operated for the past few years have resulted in a reduction in JCAR staffing.”117 One might hypothesize
that reduced staffing at JCAR translated rather significantly into reduced activity with respect to some aspects of JCAR’s consideration
of rules. While there is no indication that JCAR failed to review
newly proposed rules at its usual pace beginning in the early 1990s
(see Figure 2), the presumably more time-consuming process of issuing recommendations and objections was largely abandoned when the
JCAR budget cuts hit. Indeed, the rate of recommendation and objection activity dropped five-fold in 1991, and remained at that depressed level at least through 2014.
If budget and staffing constraints did, in fact, lead JCAR to radically reduce the time-consuming process attending recommendation
and objection activity, then one might expect to see evidence that
JCAR sought more efficient ways to influence agency rulemaking. In117. JOINT COMM.

ON

ADMIN. RULES, 1991–1996 ANNUAL REPORTS 2 (1998).
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deed, this expectation would appear to be borne out by the data. Figure 6 shows that just as JCAR’s rate of issuing recommendations and
objections declined, the percentage of prohibitions or suspensions began to rise. Recall that unlike recommendations or objections,
JCAR’s prohibition and suspension powers do have an immediate adverse impact on agency rulemaking. That effect was more muted
prior to 2004, but a prohibition on the implementation of ordinary
rulemaking (or a suspension of emergency rulemaking) would suspend operation of the rule for at least 180 days and might lead JCAR
to ask the General Assembly to permanently block the rule by a joint
resolution. After 2004, JCAR prohibitions or suspensions were permanent absent General Assembly action.
FIGURE 6. PERCENTAGE OF RULES OF ALL KINDS PROHIBITED
SUSPENDED BY JCAR ANNUALLY, 1978 TO 2014

OR

Note: Figure 6 shows the percentage of all rules that JCAR either prohibited or suspended in a
given year. There are two large increases in this type of activity—in 1991 (coinciding with
budget cuts that reduced JCAR’s staff) and in 2005 (coinciding with the General Assembly’s
grant to JCAR of veto power over agency rulemaking).

In 1991, JCAR began using its coercive powers in earnest, perhaps
deeming it more expedient to influence agency rulemaking through
the in terrorem effect of frequent prohibitions and suspensions rather
than through the gradual and less-confrontational process of offering
recommendations and objections. In any event, Figure 7 shows an inverse relationship between the volume of JCAR’s recommendations
and objections as well as its prohibitions and suspensions.
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FIGURE 7. JCAR RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBJECTIONS VERSUS
PROHIBITIONS AND SUSPENSIONS FOR RULES OF ALL
KINDS ANNUALLY, 1978 TO 2014

Note: Figure 7 plots JCAR’s recommendations and objections (the dotted line corresponding
with the left y-axis) against its prohibitions and suspensions (the solid line corresponding with
the right y-axis) to capture the inverse relationship between the committee’s noncoercive and
coercive activity. The steeper rise in prohibitions and suspensions beginning in 2005 correlates
with the grant to JCAR of veto power over agency rulemaking.

As a group, these figures show that as JCAR has decreased its reliance on recommendations and objections, it has increased its use of
prohibitions and suspensions. From 1981 to 1991, JCAR issued just
four prohibitions or suspensions. In contrast, from 1992 to 2004 it issued thirty-five, and from 2005 to 2014 it issued fifty-seven prohibitions or suspensions. To all appearance, the committee determined
around 1991 that it could influence agency rulemaking more efficiently through use of its coercive tools.
The data tells a similar story when the focus shifts to agencies’
emergency rulemaking since 1978. All things considered, it is probably a sign of a healthy system when emergency rulemaking happens
infrequently. While the necessity of having a system flexible enough
to implement rules quickly in crisis situations is beyond dispute, there
is always a cost to the public in circumventing the usual notice-andcomment period. There is also a danger that agencies will overuse the
emergency power to avoid scrutiny of their rulemaking, skirting the
ordinary processes when no true emergency exists. The trend toward
less emergency rulemaking, which is exhibited by Figure 8, might
therefore reasonably be considered a positive development.
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AGENCIES ANNUALLY,

Note: Figure 8 shows the number of rules produced by agencies annually from 1978 to 2014.
There is a steep decline after 1980 (corresponding with JCAR first gaining some coercive review
powers from the General Assembly), an unexplained spike in 1993, which is offset the next year
by a drop of similar magnitude, and a clear decline after 2004 (when JCAR was granted its veto
powers).

That said, it is difficult to ascertain what an optimal level of emergency rulemaking would be. A decline in the rate of emergency
rulemaking by agencies might signal that agencies have grown too
hesitant in implementing rules that would be of immediate benefit to
the public health and welfare. Figure 8 therefore tells an ambiguous
story. On the positive side, there was an initial drop in emergency
rulemaking from 109.3 rules per year on average from 1978 to 1980
(when JCAR had only advisory powers), to 79.2 rules per year on
average from 1981 to 2004 (when JCAR could suspend the operation
of emergency rules for up to 180 days). It would be reasonable to
posit that JCAR had a tempering influence on agencies during this
period, nudging them toward compliance with the ordinary Illinois
APA rulemaking processes. It may be that JCAR’s recommendation
and objection activity during this time, which is presented in Figure 9,
was modulated to achieve an appropriate amount of emergency
rulemaking activity by the agencies.
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Note: Figure 9 shows the annual number of JCAR recommendations and objections for emergency rules from 1985 to 2014. Prior to 1985, JCAR did not collect data on the number recommendations it issued.

But Figure 8 also shows another significant drop in emergency
rulemaking—from 79.2 rules per year on average from 1981 to 2004 to
just 56.7 rules on average per year from 2005 to 2014 (which is the
period during which JCAR possessed its veto power). These numbers
should give some pause. If agencies were in fact over-relying on their
emergency rulemaking powers when they were producing on average
109 rules per year, and were approaching a more appropriate emergency rulemaking level of about fifty-seven rules per year from 1981
to 2004, then it might be that JCAR intervention from 2005 onward
made agencies too hesitant to use their emergency rulemaking powers.
In fact, JCAR did use its suspension powers more frequently from
2005 to 2014. Figure 10 shows that the committee suspended emergency rules twelve times during those ten years, equaling the total
number of suspensions it issued for emergency rules during the previous twenty-four years combined.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-3\DPL301.txt

980

unknown

Seq: 32

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

17-OCT-16

9:27

[Vol. 65:949

FIGURE 10. JCAR SUSPENSIONS OF EMERGENCY RULES
ANNUALLY, 1978 TO 2014

Note: Figure 10 shows the annual number of JCAR suspensions of emergency rules from 1978 to
2014, though JCAR did not have suspension authority until 1981. From 2005 to 2014, the period
during which JCAR’s suspension power was presumptively permanent, the committee issued as
many suspensions as it had during the previous twenty-four years combined.

Of course, it is impossible to know from the raw numbers alone
what level of emergency rulemaking would have been optimal for Illinois agencies over the years. It may be that agencies egregiously overused their emergency powers from 1978 to 1981, were still too reliant
on emergency procedures through the 1980s and 1990s, and only
reached an optimal level when JCAR began deploying its suspension
power in earnest beginning in 2005. Or it could also be that the agencies found the optimal rate of emergency rulemaking back in 1978,
and that JCAR’s interference since then actually has worked to disadvantage the public welfare.
One should therefore be cautious in drawing conclusions from the
data presented thus far. To be sure, the numbers give some perspective on agency activity involving both ordinary and emergency agency
rulemaking, and it is certainly instructive to see the manner in which
JCAR has increasingly used coercive tools over the years to modify
agency rulemaking. All things considered, the mere existence of
JCAR review may have led to a modest reduction in the agency
rulemaking overall and of emergency rulemaking in particular. But
the steep declines in rulemaking since 2004, coupled with JCAR’s deployment of prohibition and suspension powers that have the effect of
(probably unconstitutional) legislative vetoes warrants closer inspection. The next Part will therefore look more closely at the fifty-seven
instances of JCAR prohibitions and suspensions in the JCAR veto
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era, to begin to assess qualitatively whether JCAR’s activity seems
appropriate.
IV. QUALITATIVE REVIEW OF JCAR PROHIBITIONS
SUSPENSIONS

AND

As discussed in Part I, there is intuitive appeal to legislative veto
systems as a way to police agency activity.118 But among other possible drawbacks, these schemes have the potential to obscure political
accountability for new rules, aggrandize power in the legislature at the
expense of the governor, and potentially subvert the will of the entire
legislature by a small legislative body. These dangers are particularly
pronounced when a legislative committee is free to kill rules solely for
policy reasons, thereby relegating to the executive agency the role of
factotum for the legislature. That said, to some degree these harms
might be mitigated—albeit not eliminated—by limiting the authority
of the legislative committee to veto rules only in clearly defined and
extraordinary circumstances.
The Illinois General Assembly, although arguably misguided about
the constitutionality of legislative vetoes in the state, at least recognized the need to cabin its grant of veto power to JCAR by authorizing its exercise only in emergency situations. Since September 2004,
JCAR has been empowered to issue a prohibition or suspension only
after a supermajority of the body concludes both that the rule is objectionable on statutory grounds119 and that implementation of the rule
118. Supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
119. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(a) (2014) (referencing the standards for general rulemaking
specified in Sections 100/5-100, 100/5-105, and 100/5-110 of Title 5 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes). The grounds referenced in these Sections are reprinted in this Article. See supra notes
68–70 and accompanying text. To operationalize these provisions, JCAR devised its own set of
rules and identified three categories of criteria for objections. The first category concerned substantive problems, leading JCAR to ask:
A) Does the agency have legal authority for the proposed rulemaking?
B) Does the proposed rulemaking comply with the statutory authority and legislative
intent on which it is based or that it is implementing or interpreting?
C) Does the proposed rulemaking comply with State and federal constitutions, State
and federal law, federal rules and regulations, and case law?
D) Does the proposed rulemaking include standards for the exercise of discretionary
authority?
E) Are the standards defined as clearly as practicable under the conditions?
F) Does the agency have rulemaking authority?
1 ILL. ADM. CODE tit 1, § 220.900 (2014). The second category concerned problems with propriety, for which JCAR asked:
A) Is there an adequate justification and rationale for the proposed rulemaking and for
any regulation of the public embodied in the rules?
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“would constitute a serious threat to the public interest, safety, or welfare.”120 As long as JCAR respects these preconditions on the exercise of its veto power and resists the lure of vetoing rules solely on the
basis of policy preferences, at least some of the potential drawbacks of
the legislative veto system can be minimized.
But the following analysis of the fifty-seven prohibitions and suspensions of agency rulemaking issued by JCAR from 2005 to 2014
reveals that JCAR has rarely respected the General Assembly’s restrictions on its veto activity. Four interrelated issues repeatedly arise.
First, JCAR has made little effort to explain why implementation of
the rulemakings it prohibits or suspends would pose a “serious threat”
to the public welfare.121 In fact, in most instances the blocked rules—
even if arguably contrary to statute or procedurally defective in some
way—seem innocuous at worst, and in many cases seem as if they
would be beneficial to the public.
Second, public documents—like the Flinn Reports on Illinois
agency rulemaking and JCAR’s meeting minutes—frequently leave
the impression that JCAR’s prohibitions and suspensions are motivated more by policy disagreements with the rulemaking agencies
B) Has the agency considered the economic effects of the rulemaking upon those regulated, including small businesses, not for profit corporations, units of local government,
school districts and community college districts?
C) Has the agency considered less costly alternatives to this proposed rulemaking?
D) Has the agency considered the budgetary effects of the proposed rulemaking upon
itself, other State agencies, and State revenue in general?
E) Is the language of the rules simple and clear, so that the rules can be understood by
the persons and groups they will affect?
F) Are the rules free of serious technical errors, redundancies and grammatical or typographical errors that could affect the meaning of the rules?
Id. The third category concerned procedural problems, for which JCAR asked:
A) Does the proposed rulemaking comply with Section 5-40 of the Act?
B) Does the proposed rulemaking comply with the requirements of the Administrative
Code Division?
C) Does the proposed rulemaking comply with any additional requirements imposed
on the agency by State or federal law?
D) Does the proposed rulemaking comply with the agency’s own rules for the promulgation of rules?
E) Was the agency responsive to public comments concerning the rulemaking?
F) Did the agency comply with Section 5-30 of the Act, if applicable, in connection with
the rulemaking?
Id. (citation omitted).
120. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(a).
121. See infra notes 125–54 and accompanying text (discussing examples of JCAR’s rejection
of agency rules that failed to demonstrate a “serious threat”).
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rather than by any substantive or procedural defect in the rule.122
While policy disagreements might be adequate justifications for issuing a nonbinding objection to a rule, allowing legislative vetoes solely
on these grounds threatens to significantly disrupt the balance of
power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
Third, statements by JCAR representatives in the Committee’s minutes make clear that many of the Committee’s prohibitions and suspensions from 2005 to 2014 were issued primarily to skirt the Illinois
APA’s one-year statute of limitations on agency rulemaking. JCAR
vetoed the rules, in other words, to buy time for the agencies to modify their proposed rules to JCAR’s liking, after which the veto might
be lifted.123 This behavior may be an unavoidable consequence of the
way in which the Illinois APA is structured, but JCAR’s use of
prohibitions and suspensions to toll the limitations period is neither
authorized by the Illinois APA nor consistent with its purpose.
Fourth, JCAR frequently substitutes its own interpretation of the
meaning of statutory provisions for that of the rulemaking agency,
even if the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable one.124 In doing so,
JCAR arrogates to itself power that ultimately belongs with the judiciary, undermining the notions of deference that the judiciary ordinarily
grants to agency interpretations of statutory provisions. At the very
least, JCAR’s refusal to show deference to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes introduces inconsistency between the legislative
and judicial branches in the analysis of agency action.
These four problems are in many discrete instances interrelated.
For example, when JCAR vetoes a rule based solely on a policy dispute with an agency, it invariably fails to explain why the proposed
rule would have posed a serious threat to the public. Further, JCAR
does not typically explain why an agency’s understanding of its statutory authority to create and implement a challenged rule is
unreasonable.
A. No Showing of a “Serious Threat”
JCAR cannot prohibit or suspend a rule unless, in addition to finding something in the rule that would statutorily justify the issuance of
a formal “objection,” it concludes that implementation of the rule
122. See infra notes 155–63 and accompanying text (discussing examples of JCAR’s rejection
of agency rules for policy reasons).
123. See infra notes 164–75 and accompanying text (discussing examples of JCAR rejecting
agency rules to extend the rulemaking limitations period).
124. See infra notes 176–90 and accompanying text (discussing examples of JCAR rejecting
agency rules without affording the agencies any deference).
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would constitute a “serious threat to the public interest, safety, or welfare.”125 The term “threat” is left undefined in the statute. But it
should go without saying that the requirement that JCAR must find a
“threat” must have content, limiting in some meaningful way those
circumstances in which JCAR may take the extraordinary step of
prohibiting or suspending an agency’s rules. If the requirement had
no substance, JCAR could veto agency rules whenever the committee
found the rules to be statutorily objectionable. If this had been the
General Assembly’s intent, there would have been no need to include
the “threat” language at all, and it is a fundamental tenet of statutory
interpretation that a legislature intends all of the words in its statutes
to have effect.126
Moreover, not just any threat will suffice. It is not enough for
JCAR to perceive that implementation of a rule might threaten some
harm to the public health, welfare, or safety. To exercise the extraordinary power of legislatively overriding executive agency action,
this perceived threat must be serious in nature. Again, there is no
statutory definition of the term “serious,” but the term must have
some delimiting meaning otherwise it is a riddle why the General Assembly would have included it in the Illinois APA in the first place.
Notwithstanding these observations, review of JCAR’s fifty-seven
prohibitions and suspensions from 2005 to 2014 reveals that—with
only a few arguable exceptions—the committee utterly failed to provide reasonable explanations for its conclusions that its actions were
necessary to prevent agency rules from going into effect and posing
serious threats to the public. To be clear, the main problem is not
simply that JCAR typically made no effort to explain why it perceived
these rules to represent “serious threats.” Rather, the issue is that in
nearly all instances the agencies’ proposed rules appeared likely to
enhance the public health, welfare, and safety rather than threaten it.
Before turning to examples, two things should be noted. First, the
following analysis looks only at whether JCAR made a facially plausible case for its conclusions that each of the fifty-seven rulemakings
that were prohibited or suspended from 2005 to 2014 represented a
potentially serious threat to the public. Second, it is not unreasonable
to hold JCAR to at least this relatively low standard, both because the
125. See infra notes 176–90 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Crozer v. People, 69 N.E. 489, 491 (Ill. 1903) (“It is a cardinal rule of construction that a statute should be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant, but that it shall be so construed, if possible, that
every sentence and word shall be given its ordinary meaning and acceptation.”), overruled in
part on other grounds by People ex rel. Warning v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 118 N.E. 22, 25 (Ill.
1917).
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Illinois APA demands it and because JCAR is not the last line of defense against implementation of impolitic, improperly drafted, or even
“threatening” agency rules. Indeed, JCAR’s permanent prohibition
and suspension powers are designed to be extraordinary interventions
with petitions to the courts remaining the ordinary way for blocking or
suspending the operation of problematic agency rules.127
One example of a JCAR intervention that took place without a reasonable showing of a potentially serious threat to the public occurred
in March 2008, when JCAR suspended operation of an emergency Illinois State Board of Education rule that would have prevented the
state from placing disabled students in out-of-state educational facilities that use “behavioral interventions that intentionally inflict pain as
a means of control.”128 The Board of Education had learned that a
facility housing an Illinois student sometimes used “techniques such as
the administration of electrical shock as methods of behavioral control,”129 and the Board believed the situation presented an emergency
that needed to be addressed by rule “immediately.”130 JCAR nonetheless suspended the emergency rule because, according to a member
whose comments were summarized in the JCAR meeting minutes, the
Board of Education “has not shown the existence of any emergency
situation that warrants by-passing the public notice and opportunity to
comment afforded by the regular rulemaking process.”131
JCAR’s conclusion that there was no real emergency and that the
Board of Education should have used ordinary rulemaking procedures may or may not be reasonable. According to the Illinois APA,
an emergency is defined as “the existence of any situation that any
agency finds reasonably constitutes a threat to the public interest,
safety, or welfare.”132 That question need not concern us here. What
is puzzling is why JCAR concluded that a rule designed to prevent
electrical shock from being used against an Illinois student was itself a
“serious threat” to the public health, safety, and welfare. Nothing in
127. See, e.g., Cty. of Du Page v. ILRB., 830 N.E.2d 709, 714–15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (suspending operation of an Illinois Labor Relations Board rule because there was no emergency
and discussing similar precedents).
128. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (June 17, 2008) [hereinafter JCAR MINUTES,
June 2008] (suspension published at 32 Ill. Reg. at 9764, 9764 (July 7, 2008)). See Special Education Facilities Under Section 14-7.02 of the School Code, 32 Ill. Reg. 4843, 4843 (proposed Apr.
4, 2008).
129. 32 Ill. Reg. at 4844.
130. Id.
131. JCAR MINUTES, June 2008, supra note 128 (summarizing the statement of Rep. Lou
Lang).
132. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-45(a) (2014).
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the public record sheds any light on the committee’s reasoning.133
Three months later, after the Board of Education promulgated the
same rule using the ordinary rulemaking procedures prescribed by the
Illinois APA, JCAR once more blocked the rule, prohibiting it again
without explaining the nature of the rule’s potential “serious threat”
to the public.134
In another instance, JCAR prohibited the implementation of Illinois Department of Labor rules designed to enforce a statutory mandate that hotel room attendants be provided with two fifteen-minute
paid breaks during each workday.135 The Department of Labor’s proposed rule would have required the breaks to be taken nonconsecutively.136 Members of JCAR prohibited the rule’s implementation
because they saw no value in restricting employees from “voluntarily
exercising flexibility in a manner that could be to the employee’s
benefit.”137
Again, it is unnecessary here to decide whether JCAR or the Department of Labor had superior policy arguments, or to figure out
which body better understood the legislative intent behind the General Assembly’s two-break rule. It may well be that the Department
of Labor’s reading of its statutory authority was an unreasonable one
that would not stand up in court even under a deferential standard of
review. It is nonetheless worth noting that the Department of Labor
in fact articulated a coherent explanation for the substance of its rule,
noting its belief that the “general legislative intent” behind the statutorily mandated breaks was “to prevent repetitive motion injuries,”
and that taking breaks at the beginning or end of the day is not going
to alleviate the injury factor.138
133. JCAR was necessarily concluding both that the Board of Education was wrong to believe
that the threat of use of electrical shock against an Illinois student represented a threat to the
public health, safety or welfare, and that the Board’s rule itself posed a serious threat to the
public health, safety, or welfare. These are not logically irreconcilable positions, but some explanation for the conclusions would seem warranted. Cf. 32 Ill. Reg. 18908, 18908 (Dec. 5, 2008)
(suspending a peremptory rule that raised Food Stamp benefit amounts without explaining why
the rule might constitute a serious threat to the public); see also JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN.
RULES, THE FLINN REPORT 4–5 (Nov. 21, 2008) (discussing the suspension).
134. See 32 Ill. Reg. 16275, 16275 (Dec. 1, 2006).
135. See 30 Ill. Reg. 18793, 18793–94 (Dec. 1, 2006); JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Nov. 14, 2006) [hereinafter JCAR MINUTES, Nov. 2006]. The statute itself requires that
“every hotel room attendant shall receive a minimum of 2 15-minute paid rest breaks and one
30-minute meal period in each workday on which the hotel room attendant works at least 7
hours.” 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/3.1(c) (2014).
136. See 29 Ill. Reg. 19106, 19114 (Nov. 28, 2005).
137. 30 Ill. Reg. at 18793; see also JCAR MINUTES, Nov. 2006, supra note 135.
138. JCAR MINUTES, Nov. 2006, supra note 135.
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Even provisionally accepting that JCAR was correct about the substance of the Department of Labor’s rule as a matter of both sound
public policy and statutory construction,139 it is difficult to fathom how
mandating nonconsecutive fifteen-minute work breaks could constitute a real threat to the public welfare, never mind a serious threat to
the public welfare. Such a rule may be paternalistic, inadvisable, unauthorized by statute, reversible by the courts, and even a “threat” in
the sense that a worker might lose the opportunity to curry favor with
an employer by agreeing to take her breaks in one half-hour time
span. But to conclude that implementation of such a rule would pose
a “serious threat” to the public welfare empties this statutory requirement of meaning.
Something similar occurred with respect to a JCAR prohibition of
an Illinois Department of Human Services rule that would have established application procedures and grant-issuance guidelines for autism
research funding. JCAR prohibited the rules, explaining during its
meeting that “JCAR has taken a firm position that grant rules should
be very clear and specific because they involve the awarding of public
funds,” and that even though “JCAR understands that this particular
program involves a relatively small amount of money that was generated from an income tax check-off that is not likely to be repeated,”
the Committee would find the rule a threat to the public interest.140
Again, JCAR failed entirely to articulate why these rules constituted
a potential serious threat to the public.141
Other examples from among the fifty-seven prohibitions and suspensions from 2005 to 2014 are discussed below. Unless otherwise
indicated, JCAR offered no explanation in public documents for its
conclusion that a veto was necessary to protect the public against a
serious threat if the contested rule were implemented.
• JCAR prohibited the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (DFPR) rules that would have helped protect borrowers from deceptive “payday” loans by, among other
things, prohibiting oppressive arbitration agreements and collection procedures. JCAR stated at its meeting that it was “concerned that the rulemaking may exceed the Department’s
statutory authority and questions whether the proposal actually
gets at the problem DFPR is attempting to address,”142 but it
139. Senator Steve Rauschenberger informed the Department of Labor representatives at the
JCAR meeting that “it is JCAR’s responsibility to interpret statute [sic].” Id.
140. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Sept. 15, 2009).
141. See 33 Ill. Reg. 13945, 13945 (Oct. 2, 2009) (prohibiting the rule).
142. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (July 11, 2006) [hereinafter JCAR MINUTES,
JULY 2006].
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did not explain why the rules if implemented would pose a serious threat to the public welfare.143
• JCAR prohibited the Illinois Secretary of State’s proposed rule
that would have narrowed the circumstances in which a motor
vehicle driver may be exempted from having to use a Breath
Alcohol Ignition Installation Device.144
• JCAR suspended an Illinois Department of Healthcare and
Family Services (HFS) emergency rulemaking that added antibiotics to the list of medication types that do not need prior approval from the agency for reimbursement when the prescription
would put a patient above the Save Medicaid Access and Resources Together (SMART) Act limit of four prescriptions per
month.145
• JCAR suspended an HFS emergency rulemaking that eliminated the need for patients to get prior approval from the
agency before being transferred from one hospital to another
when they must do so in order to obtain services not available at
the discharging hospital.146
• JCAR prohibited the Illinois Department of Agriculture’s first
ever regulation of “doggy day care” businesses because the
agency “inadequately describes the need for the new regulatory
activity” and to adopt this rulemaking “without a clear understanding of its purpose could pose a threat to the public
interest.”147
• JCAR prohibited an Elevator Safety Review Board rule that
would have required elevator mechanics to work under the direct supervision of a licensed contractor because the failure to
allow the public adequate time to comment on the provision
“would constitute a serious threat to the public interest.”148
• JCAR suspended an emergency rulemaking from the HFS that
expanded health insurance coverage for low-income adults because the “inclusion of policy within this emergency rule that
143. See 30 Ill. Reg. 13029, 13029 (July 28, 2006).
144. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, THE FLINN REPORT 3 (Jan. 13, 2012).
145. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, THE FLINN REPORT 5–6 (Aug. 17, 2012) (suspension
published at 36 Ill. Reg. 13736, 13736 (Aug. 31, 2012)).
146. Id.
147. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Feb. 6, 2007) (prohibition published at 31 Ill.
Reg. 3207, 3207 (Feb. 23, 2007)).
148. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, THE FLINN REPORT 3 (Mar. 16, 2007) (prohibition
published at 31 Ill. Reg. 5169, 5169 (Mar. 30, 2007)).
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does not address a valid emergency is not in the public
interest.”149
• JCAR suspended an HFS rulemaking that would have required
prescriptions to be written on tamper-resistant prescription pads
because the agency’s “unauthorized use of peremptory rulemaking presents a threat to the public interest.”150

The “serious threat” standard is not impossible to meet. In at least
a few instances, JCAR’s prohibitions and suspensions were for rules
that on their face might be understood to pose a serious threat to the
public health, safety, or welfare. Among these instances was an HFS
emergency rulemaking that denied payment for hospital admissions
when a patient suffered from a “Medicare-defined hospital acquired
condition,” because the rulemaking was contrary to federal regulations, was more “punitive” than required by state or federal law, and
would be “likely to impede access to care,” thereby constituting “a
threat to the public interest, safety and welfare.”151 Another HFS rule
that JCAR suspended would have eliminated enhanced payment rates
for hospital-based physical therapy.152 A third involved a rule that
would have reduced reimbursements for ventilator care in nursing
homes because the HFS rule “will cause financial hardship for nursing
homes that agree to take ventilator dependent residents and it could
threaten the health, safety and welfare of nursing home residents.”153
That said, for most of the other prohibitions and suspensions of
agency rulemaking from this period, JCAR failed to articulate a reasonable argument for why it perceived the rules to present a serious
threat to the public.154 The conclusion to be drawn is that JCAR, at
149. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, THE FLINN REPORT 3 (Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter
FLINN REPORT, Nov. 2007] (suspension published at 31 Ill. Reg. 16060, 16060 (Nov. 30, 2007)).
150. Id. at 5–6.
151. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Aug. 14, 2012) (suspension published at 36
Ill. Reg. 13737, 13737 (Aug. 31, 2012)).
152. Id. (suspension published at 36 Ill. Reg. 13739, 13739 (Aug. 31, 2012)).
153. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Jan. 14, 2014) (suspension published at 38 Ill.
Reg. 3385, 3385 (Jan. 31, 2014)).
154. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (June 16, 2009) (suspension published at 33 Ill. Reg. 9520, 9520 (July 6, 2009)) (voting to suspend a Department of Health and
Human Services rule that would have authorized payment of enhanced rates for health insurance costs to qualified in-home provider agencies “because the agency offered no satisfactory
rationale for its use of emergency rulemaking”); JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES
(Apr. 12, 2011) (prohibition published at 35 Ill. Reg. 7228, 7228 (Apr. 29, 2011)) (voting to
prohibit a Board of Education proposed rule that would have required candidates entering principal training programs to have four years of teaching experience because the enabling statute
“requires that candidates complete 4 years of teaching before receiving principal certification,
not before beginning the education and training that will qualify them for that certification”); id.
(prohibition published at 35 Ill. Reg. 7230, 7230 (Apr. 29, 2011)) (voting to prohibit a proposed
rule by the Board of Education that would have allowed two persons who live and work outside
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least since 2005, has interfered with executive agency activity and acted beyond its statutory authority in scores of instances.
B. Prohibiting and Suspending for Policy Reasons
One result of JCAR’s failure to respect the “serious threat” limit on
the use of its prohibition and suspension powers is to increase the likelihood that JCAR will block agency rules primarily on the basis of
policy disagreements. It was not unreasonable for the General Assembly to authorize JCAR to object to agency rules on policy grounds,
since objections alone cannot block the implementation of those rules
if the agency opts not to withdraw or modify them. But permanently
blocking rules on the basis of no more than a policy dispute is to effectuate an institutional power grab, disrupting the balance of power
among the legislative, executive and judicial branches.
One example of a JCAR veto that seems to have been motivated
solely by a policy disagreement occurred in 2006, when JCAR prohibited implementation of a set of Board of Education rules that would
have prohibited the sale of junk food in elementary schools anywhere
on school grounds, instead of just in food service areas, as had previously been the requirement.155 JCAR’s problem with the new rules
was not that they were inconsistent with the enabling statute’s legislative intent, or that the Board of Education was unauthorized to issue
them, or that the Board had failed to follow the procedural requireof Illinois to be members of the Principal Preparation Review Panel, because “[i]nclusion of
these persons does not provide the Illinois experience necessary to determine whether a principal preparation program adequately serves Illinois principals and trainees”); JOINT COMM. ON
ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (July 12, 2011) (suspension published at 35 Ill. Reg. 12832, 12832 (July
29, 2011)) (voting to suspend, without explaining the nature of the emergency rule’s presumed
“serious threat,” an Office of the State Treasurer’s emergency rule that would have stopped the
practice of notifying participants in an investment pool that there has been a decrease in the
amount of administrative fees the investor will be charged because the cost of providing notice
of the fee reduction to investors would itself raise their administrative fees, making the whole
process irrational); JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Oct. 22, 2013) (prohibition published at 37 Ill. Reg. 17996, 17996 (Nov. 8, 2013)) (voting to prohibit a Department of Natural
Resources’ proposed rule that would have established a nonrefundable fee for entities that applied for agency grants); JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES 2–3 (Sept. 18, 2007) (prohibition published at 31 Ill. Reg. 14119, 14119 (Oct. 5, 2007)) (voting to prohibit an Illinois
Department of Finance and Professional Regulation rule that would have required insurance
companies to provide one-page monthly reports stating how much they collected in premiums
and paid out in claims, leading the agency representative to remind the Committee “that JCAR
rules authorize the Committee to suspend an emergency rule only if that rule poses a serious,
immediate threat to the public interest, safety and welfare” (emphasis added)); JOINT COMM. ON
ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Feb. 13, 2008) (suspension published at 32 Ill. Reg. 3114, 3114 (Feb.
29, 2008) (voting to suspend HFS emergency rules increasing reimbursements for nursing services for geriatric facilities because there was no real emergency)).
155. See School Food Service, 30 Ill. Reg. 86 (proposed Jan. 6, 2006).
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ments laid out in the Illinois APA. Rather, JCAR thought the junk
food rules were not bold enough; the rules, according to one of the
JCAR members, were “problematic in not providing a total approach
to child nutrition education, diet and exercise.”156 The agency’s approach was, in a word, too “narrow.”157
To be sure, there may be much to recommend JCAR’s approach to
school nutrition, and the Board of Education’s junk-food rulemaking
may well have been far too cautious. But without identifying any substantive or procedural flaws in the rulemaking—and without providing any indication that this innocuous junk-food rule would pose a
serious threat to the public if implemented—JCAR arrogated to itself
the remarkable power to dictate executive agency activity for no reason beyond its differing policy preferences. Allowing such action to
stand perverts separation of powers principles in the state.
Many of the rules that JCAR prohibited or suspended from 2005 to
2014 similarly seem to have been premised primarily if not solely on
policy disagreements with the promulgating agencies rather than by
asserted violations of statutory authority, incompatibility with legislative intent, or procedural problems. Among them are the following:
• JCAR prohibited a proposed rule from the Board of Education
that would have allowed persons who live and work outside of
Illinois to be members of the Principal Preparation Review
Panel, because “[i]nclusion of these persons does not provide
the Illinois experience necessary to determine whether a principal preparation program adequately serves Illinois principals
and trainees.”158
• JCAR prohibited Board of Education rules concerning special
education, explaining obliquely that it did so “because its adoption of policies, not mandated by the U.S. Department of Education, poses a serious threat to the interests of children with
disabilities and of special education teachers.”159
• JCAR prohibited a Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation rule that would have protected borrowers from payday loans in part because JCAR was “concerned that the
rulemaking may exceed the Department’s statutory authority,”
but chiefly because members “question[ed] whether the propo156. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Apr. 11, 2006) (summarizing statement of
Rep. Larry McKeon).
157. Id.
158. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Apr. 12, 2011) (prohibition published at 35
Ill. Reg. 7230, 7230 (Apr. 29, 2011)).
159. 31 Ill. Reg. 2036, 2036 (Jan. 26, 2007); JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Jan. 9,
2007).
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sal actually gets at the problem DFPR is attempting to
address.”160
• JCAR prohibited an HFS rule that would have authorized the
agency to reimburse primary care physicians for preventive
treatment, contending simply that it was too expensive.161
• JCAR prohibited another HFS rule that would have expanded
Medicare coverage, with one JCAR member explaining that
“while I feel [the agency] probably had the authority to go ahead
with this, the problem I have is still the budget part of it.”162
• JCAR prohibited the implementation of rules from DHS that
addressed “Partner Abuse Intervention” because “the rulemakings contain language that makes assumptions and generalities
that may be unfounded and thus would not be appropriate for
State administrative law.”163

For obvious reasons, the Illinois APA does not authorize JCAR to
prohibit or suspend rules solely on the basis of policy disagreements
with rulemaking agencies. If JCAR could micromanage agency output and veto rules even when there was no substantive or procedural
defect and no serious threat to the public from the rules, the executive
agencies would effectively be puppets of the legislative committee.
Neither the Illinois constitution nor the General Assembly’s statutory
grant of power to JCAR allows for such a subversion of separation of
powers principles.
C. Prohibiting To Avoid the Limitations Period
In an unexpected number of instances between 2005 and 2014,
JCAR forthrightly explained that it was prohibiting rules in order to
extend the rulemaking limitations period. In effect, JCAR openly acknowledged that its prohibitions were often tactical, designed simply
to buy time for the agencies to modify their rules in accord with
JCAR’s demands. There is nothing in the Illinois APA that authorizes
this use of the Committee’s prohibition powers. Unsurprisingly, in
these situations JCAR typically neglects to explain why its prohibitions are necessary to protect the public against a serious threat.
160. JCAR MINUTES, July 2006, supra note 142 (prohibition published at 30 Ill. Reg. 13029,
13029 (July 28, 2006)).
161. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Jan. 9, 2008) (prohibition published at 32 Ill.
Reg. 1168, 1168 (Jan. 25, 2008)).
162. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Feb. 26, 2008) (prohibition published at 32
Ill. Reg. 4110, 4110 (Mar. 14, 2008)).
163. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, THE FLINN REPORT 4 (June 20, 2014).
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JCAR’s use of its prohibition power as a tolling device was in evidence in the very first prohibitions of the JCAR veto era, when JCAR
blocked a package of five Illinois Department of Public Health
(IDPH) rulemakings in January 2005.164 The proposed rules would
have revamped requirements concerning “the design, construction
and operation of manufactured” housing.165 JCAR felt that the DPH
had been only partly responsive to critiques made by commentators
and wanted to give affected parties more opportunity to convince the
agency to modify its proposed rules.166 The one-year Illinois APA
limitations period on rulemaking was running out, however. Accordingly, in order to “afford DPH and the affected parties more time to
resolve the remaining issues with this package of rulemakings,” JCAR
explained that it would “object to the rulemakings and prohibit their
filing in the current form,” with the result that the action “will stop the
tolling of the 1-year rulemaking process.”167
Some of the other instances of tolling-by-prohibition include:
• JCAR prohibited an HFS rule that limited the size of weekly
psychotherapy group sessions because, according to one JCAR
member, although “considerable progress” had been made
among parties interested in the rulemaking, he believed that
with “a little more time, . . . more issues can be resolved,” and
that the “only way to get that time at this point is with a Filing
Prohibition.”168
• JCAR prohibited Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation rules that would have protected borrowers from payday loans in part to “allow more time for work on [disputed]
issues.”169
• JCAR prohibited Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services rules concerning agency licensure requirements for day
care homes because lack of clarity in the rules would take time
to resolve, and “the only way to now delay action on the
rulemaking is to issue a Filing Prohibition.”170
164. See JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, THE FLINN REPORT 2 (Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter
FLINN REPORT, Jan. 2005].
165. 28 Ill. Reg. 1652 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004).
166. FLINN REPORT, Jan. 2005, supra note 164, at 2.
167. Id. (prohibition published at 29 Ill. Reg. 1588, 1588 (Jan. 28, 2005)).
168. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (June 16, 2009) (prohibition published at 33
Ill. Reg. 9519, 9519 (July 6, 2009)).
169. JCAR MINUTES, July 2006, supra note 142 (prohibition published at 30 Ill. Reg. 13029,
13029 (July 28, 2006)).
170. Id. (prohibitions published at 30 Ill. Reg. 13030, 13030 (July 28, 2006); and 30 Ill. Reg.
13031, 13031 (July 28, 2006)).
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• JCAR prohibited Department of Public Health rules for the
purpose of “giving the affected parties time to draft compromise
language” on the rules.171
• JCAR prohibited the Illinois Department of Agriculture’s
“doggy day care” rules because JCAR wanted more information
about the industry, and there was no way for the agency to get
an extension of the deadline for the rulemaking without JCAR
filing a prohibition.172
• JCAR prohibited an Illinois Department of Natural Resources
rule that would have created an exclusion zone around some
state dams because “JCAR still has some issues with this
rulemaking” and the only way to gain time for resolving the issues was for the agency either to start over or for JCAR to “prohibit filing of this rulemaking until issues are resolved.”173
• JCAR characterized its prohibition of a Department of Public
Health proposed rulemaking concerning staffing requirements
for nursing homes as “a procedural motion not meant as a judgment on the content of the rule” that was “intended simply to
give DPH more time to address concerns about how the rules
were drafted.”174
• JCAR prohibited a Department of Natural Resources proposed
rule establishing a nonrefundable fee to entities applying for
grants because “lack of time has become an issue” and filing a
prohibition “would be the only option remaining that would provide DNR with adequate time to address the rulemaking’s
deficiencies.”175

These time-buying prohibitions are not authorized by statute.
JCAR members often suggest during meetings with agency representatives that their willingness to use the prohibition power to toll the
limitations period of the Illinois APA is really a collegial maneuver
designed to give the agency some temporal breathing room and an
opportunity to collaborate with JCAR and its staff. Nonetheless, the
reason the limitations period needs to be tolled in the first place is
JCAR’s discontent with the rules that the agencies have proposed.
171. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Jan. 11, 2005) (prohibition published at 29
Ill. Reg. 1588, 1588 (Jan. 28, 2005)).
172. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Feb. 6, 2007) (prohibition published at 31 Ill.
Reg. 3207, 3207 (Feb. 23, 2007)).
173. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (July 14, 2009) (prohibition published at 33
Ill. Reg. 11359 (July 31, 2009)).
174. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Mar. 6, 2012) (prohibition published at 36
Ill. Reg. 4460, 4460 (Mar. 23, 2012)).
175. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Oct. 22, 2013) (prohibition published at 37
Ill. Reg. 17996, 17996 (Nov. 8, 2012)).
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Delay-by-prohibition should therefore be understood as just another
tool in JCAR’s arsenal, allowing it to pressure agencies to conform
their rulemaking to JCAR’s pleasure. Such prohibitions are emblematic of the new dynamic in rulemaking in Illinois in the JCAR veto
era, where executive agencies are occasionally forced to act like drafting agents for the JCAR legislative committee.
D. Failure To Accord Any Deference to Agencies
As noted supra, most states no longer allow their legislatures or legislative committees to prohibit the enforcement of administrative
agency rules except through the ordinary lawmaking process.176 If
agencies are alleged to have acted beyond their statutory authority or
to have failed to follow the procedures required by state equivalents
of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, it falls to the courts to
determine whether the contested rules can be implemented or remain
in effect. When there are judicial challenges in Illinois, just as in the
federal system and in other states, the courts will assess whether the
enabling statute is ambiguous about the nature and extent of the
rulemaking powers in which the agency has been authorized to engage. If the statute is found to be ambiguous, the courts will defer to
agency interpretations of the statute so long as they are not arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious.177
This deferential standard serves several purposes. First, it pays due
respect to the (hypothesized) legislative decision to leave statutory
language ambiguous in order to allow agency experts the freedom to
interpret the legislative grant of power in a reasonable fashion.178
Second, the deferential standard is a gesture of institutional modesty,
with the courts acknowledging that personnel in the agencies, rather
than in the courts, possess the requisite expertise to produce effective
176. Supra note 87 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Midwest Petroleum Marketers Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 402 N.E.2d 709, 715
(Ill. 1980) (“A reviewing court may set aside administrative regulations only if they are clearly
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”); Rend Lake Coll. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 3708 v. Bd. of
Cmty. Coll., 405 N.E.2d 364, 368 (Ill. 1980) (“Reviewing courts may interfere with the construction and application of regulations only where administrative interpretation is plainly erroneous.”); Ill. Coal Operators Ass’n v. Pollution Cont. Bd., 319 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ill. 1974)
(upholding the Pollution Control Board’s sound-emission regulations when the court could not
conclude that they were clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious). The Illinois courts exercise what in the federal system is called “Chevron deference,” deferring to the agency staff’s
expertise and experience. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843–45 (1984).
178. Monsanto Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 367 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ill. 1977) (“When a regulation is promulgated by an agency pursuant to a grant of legislative power, a reviewing court
should not substitute its judgment as to the content of the regulation, because the legislature has
placed the power to create such regulations in the agency and not in the court.”).
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and efficient rules to carry out the purposes of the enabling statutes.179
Finally, the deferential standard has the effect of forcing legislators to
draft more precise statutes—and to accept political responsibility for
their choices—if they want to be sure to restrain agency behavior.
Legislative veto schemes—whether the veto is held by the entire
legislature, by one house, or by a legislative committee as in Illinois—
by their nature threaten to disrupt the balance among the three
branches that is instantiated by the deferential judicial standard for
reviewing agency rulemaking activity. Indeed, as a practical matter,
legislative veto systems cut the judiciary out of the rulemaking process
in a large number of instances, since it is difficult for a potential plaintiff to challenge a rule on the grounds that it would have been different in a particular way but for legislative committee interference.
These problems are heightened when, as in Illinois, the body holding the legislative veto makes no effort to defer to agency interpretations of a statute, and instead relegates to itself final authority for
determining the meaning of statutory language and of the legislative
intent that motivated its passage. To take one example, JCAR prohibited the implementation of a proposed Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation rule that would have required insurance companies to provide the agency with one-page information sheets providing insurance-plan enrollment data, amounts the insurance companies
collected from customers in premiums, how much they paid out in
claims, and similar information.180 During its meeting with JCAR, the
Department’s representative explained to the members that it deemed
this information necessary due to the “acute information deficit”
about insurers in Illinois, which “harms our ability to regulate” and
“impairs legislators’ ability to understand what is happening in this
State and to evaluate whether the information they get from the insur-

179. The courts give agency interpretations of rulemaking authority deference because they
have been “appointed by law and informed by experience.” Monarch Gas Co. v. Ill. Commerce
Comm’n, 366 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977). The Illinois courts nonetheless retain ultimate
authority with respect to the construction of statutes. People v. Roos, 514 N.E.2d 993, 998 (Ill.
1987) (“Although courts give substantial weight and deference to an interpretation of a statute
by the agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute, such interpretations are not binding on the courts.”); People ex rel. Thompson v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 317
N.E.2d 121, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (“[W]here the authority of an administrative body is in
question the determination of the scope of its power and authority is a judicial function; not a
question to be finally determined by the administrative agency itself.”).
180. See JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter JCAR MINOct. 2007]; see also 31 Ill. Reg. 10546 (proposed July 27, 2007).

UTES,
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ance industry and consumer groups is accurate.”181 When JCAR
members questioned whether the Department had statutory authority
to demand such information from insurers, the representative responded with thirty citations to statutory authority.182
To be sure, simply because an agency’s advocate claims to have
overwhelming statutory support for the agency’s action, this does not
settle the question of whether the agency was in fact authorized to
engage in the challenged rulemaking. If the question of authority
were before the courts, we would ask whether the statutory provisions
were at least ambiguous, and if so then we would determine whether
the agency’s interpretation of its statutory authority was reasonable,
nonarbitrary, and noncapricious. But the question was instead in
front of JCAR, and the legislative committee was keen on assuring
that the Department could not “exploit” any ambiguity in the statute.
JCAR members suggested that the executive branch was using ambiguous statutory provisions to implement insurance-regulation policies that had not been explicitly authorized by the General Assembly,
stating that the agency was “going to be held to a very strict construction of what is statutorily authorized.”183 In other words, JCAR
would show no deference to agency interpretations of statutory provisions that the General Assembly had left ambiguous. As the same
JCAR member explained, although the statute “clearly gives the Department the authority to require information designed to determine
the solvency of health insurance companies, . . . there is a question as
to whether that authority is as broad as [the Department] would like
to depict it.”184 Another member stated that “it comes down to
whether [the] statute currently authorizes data collection to determine
solvency or whether it authorizes a broader range of data collection,”
and when a “statute creates a gray area like this, the statute needs to be
clarified.”185 Yet a third member explained that “the issue here is
vagueness in the statute that is resulting in legislating by rule,” and the
member warned that “JCAR is stating that in this instance, and perhaps in others to come, these matters should be clarified by the General Assembly.”186
181. JCAR MINUTES, Oct. 2007, supra note 180 (summarizing statements of Michael
McRaith, Dir., Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation’s Division of
Insurance).
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. Id. (emphasis added) (summarizing the statement of Rep. John Fritchey).
185. Id. (emphasis added) (summarizing the statement of Rep. Rosemary Mulligan).
186. Id. (emphasis added) (summarizing the statement of Rep. David Leitch).
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There are a number of other instances of JCAR prohibitions and
suspensions in which JCAR exhibited no interest in deferring to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, typically by indicating
that the agency had no specific statutory authority to regulate as it had
done. For example, JCAR prohibited a Central Management Services
rule that would have created alternative methods to sealed bidding,
stating that the agency lacked “clear statutory authority to vary from
the requirements of the Procurement Code . . . .”187 In another instance, JCAR prohibited a pair of Department of Human Services
rules that would have eliminated asset limits for recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and General Assistance funds because the agency “lack[ed] specific statutory authority to expand
TANF and GA in a way that will subject the State to unknown additional costs.”188 Likewise, JCAR prohibited a Department of Financial and Professional Regulation rule that would have established
minimum fees charged for real estate purchase “closing protection letters” on the ground that the Department lacked “specific statutory
authority.”189 And the same rationale was used by JCAR when it suspended emergency rulemaking from the Illinois Gaming Board because the agency did “not have specific statutory authority to create
the Video Gaming Exclusion List.”190
JCAR’s refusal to show any deference to agency statutory interpretations is of a piece with its treatment of executive agencies as workhorses under the legislative committee’s supervision. Few would
dispute that JCAR staffers and members work in good faith to assure
that only effective, beneficial, and efficient rules are implemented in
the state. But, the legislative committee’s readiness to deploy its veto
powers in circumstances beyond its statutory authority shows that
JCAR is far from respecting executive agencies as representatives of a
coequal branch of government.
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois General Assembly’s creation of JCAR nearly four decades ago was motivated by a sound purpose—to assure that agencies
187. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (June 13, 2007) (emphasis added) (summarizing the statement of Sen. Bradley Burzynski) (prohibition published at 31 Ill. Reg. 9532, 9532
(July 6, 2007)).
188. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Sept. 15, 2009) (emphasis added) (prohibition published at 33 Ill. Reg. 13947, 13947 (Oct. 2, 2009)).
189. JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (May 10, 2011) (emphasis added) (prohibition published at 35 Ill. Reg. 8250, 8250 (May 27, 2011)).
190. 38 Ill. Reg. 3384, 3384 (Jan. 31, 2014) (emphasis added); see also JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN. RULES, MINUTES (Jan. 14, 2014).
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in the burgeoning administrative state did not exceed their statutory
rulemaking authority and begin sliding into unwarranted lawmaking.
As initially conceived, JCAR’s work would be achieved primarily
through cooperation with agencies. In extreme cases, the legislative
committee might seek corrective legislation from the General Assembly, but the object was to inform and persuade agency rulemakers
about the proper ambit of their function. Notwithstanding JCAR’s
self-reported success at this task, the General Assembly soon granted
itself veto powers over agency rulemaking and, in late 2004, delegated
the veto power to JCAR’s twelve members.
The JCAR veto scheme is likely unconstitutional, but this Article
has shown some of the ways in which it is also unwise. To be sure,
there has been a decline in both the overall volume of agency
rulemaking and in the number of emergency rules passed by agencies
since JCAR came into being, and it is plausible to speculate that
JCAR has had a hand in bringing about a more optimal amount of
rulemaking. But even assuming that the volume of agency rulemaking
is closer to ideal than it previously was, the data presented in this Article reveal that these results are largely due to coercion on JCAR’s
part rather than cooperation with the agencies.
More distressing is that since JCAR was granted veto powers it has
not restricted itself to prohibiting and suspending rules only in statutorily authorized situations. JCAR rarely deploys its veto power to protect the public health, safety, and welfare from a “serious threat,”
instead frequently opting to block the implementation of rules primarily on policy grounds. This type of behavior is, perhaps, a predictable
result of placing such tremendous power in the hands of a small committee, but it is not one that the citizenry of Illinois should
countenance.
There is little likelihood that the General Assembly will vote to roll
back the legislative veto powers it has granted to itself and to JCAR.
But should the Illinois Supreme Court find, at some time in the future,
that the JCAR veto scheme is unconstitutional, the people of Illinois
should think long and hard before amending the state’s constitution to
reinstitute the legislative veto.
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